http://blog.limkitsiang.com/2011/04/26/new-urban-thinking-led-to-bn-losses-in-sarawak-towns/
by Ronald Benjamin
The Malaysian Insider
April 25, 2011
APRIL 25 — Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s comments that the racist politics of DAP has been exported to Sarawak clearly reveal his ethnic prejudice and insecurity.
His simplistic comments fail to consider the current political and cultural trends among the urban population whose political sense and approach to issues is increasingly rooted in universal justice, equality and pragmatism.
Ethnic issues are minimal in this paradigm of thinking.
The Barisan National coalition of ethnic-based parties is still finding it difficult to come to terms with this new political paradigm that goes beyond mere ethnic accommodation. The urban middle-class is basically connected to a global world, where a sense of equality, meritocracy and democratic expression is the norm in any enlightened civil society.
For example, some of these educated middle class tell me that the Malaysian political scenario has similarities with the ancient imperial kingdoms, where the king would always keep his close trusted associates or cronies loyal by presenting them with goodies.
The wealth of the nation was basically controlled by powerful elites linked to the king while the commoners went hungry. If there was a possibility for the king to visit the countryside, there would be disbursements of money to make the subjects temporally happy while conditions that create poverty or widen the gap between the rich and poor were ignored.
In other words, the king would continue to create a sense of dependency among his subjects so that they would not question his opulence and authority. Is this ancient story not similar to our Malaysian situation when it comes to dealing with the rural population?
It is in this context that the BN’s poor showing in the urban constituencies in Sarawak should be analysed. The chief minister had been accused of enriching his family and cronies but the political leadership in KL and investigative institutions such as the MACC have not yet taken action.
The selective attitude towards corruption especially if involves the highest levels has alienated the educated middle class. While a slew of issues contributed to the BN’s defeat in the urban areas, the failure to investigate Taib Mahmud following allegations of abuse of power is the major cause of the Barisan’s defeat in urban constituencies in Sarawak.
The political old guard like Dr Mahathir and Umno have to come to terms with the present situation, where universal values such as equality, justice and pluralism hold sway, instead of pinning the blame for the defeat in urban areas on “racism” by a political party. — aliran.com
Tuesday, April 26, 2011
Ibans storm SUPP office asking ‘election reward’
http://blog.limkitsiang.com/2011/04/26/ibans-storm-supp-office-asking-election-reward/
Malaysiakini
Apr 26, 11
More than 100 Ibans stormed the Sibu headquarters of the Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP) yesterday, demanding the balance of RM400 a person as their reward promised for backing a party candidate who won in the recent state election, an election watchdog has revealed.
Sibu Election Watch (SEW) in a press statement released in the Sarawak town late yesterday evening said the Ibans were upset that they did not get the “balance”, despite being promised by SUPP election agents as well as the tuai rumah (longhouse headman) before polling day.
The incident was first reported by the web portal Sarawak Indigenous Community News and tweeted by DAP Sarawak chairman and Bukit Assek assemblyperson Wong Ho Leng (left), who was present at the site yesterday.
Soon after the news broke out, SEW sent two representatives to the Sibu SUPP headquarters to check out the situation.
Its probe, SEW said, showed that the Ibans were promised an upfront payment of RM100 before voting day on April 16 and if the SUPP candidate won, they would each be paid another RM400 after the election.
SEW said its representatives have witnessed Ibans from at least two longhouses being paid the “balance” of RM400 each.
The election watch said the Ibans were from Rumah Chandi, Rumah Pasang and Rumah Ujang.
When the SEW representatives were leaving the scene, it said, only the residents from Rumah Chandi and Rumah Pasang had collected the money from SUPP.
“One of the residents from Rumah Chandi even distributed a stack of RM100 bills to the longhouse folk holding their identity cards in front of us,” SEW said.
Quarrel with tuai rumah
SEW said it interviewed one Iban voter from Rumah Ujang, who revealed that the Iban folk had a quarrel with their tuai rumah for not getting their RM400 even a week after polling day.
“However, the tuai rumah hit back that some people had voted for DAP and did not deserve to get the RM400 balance,” said the young Iban man SEW quoted in its press statement.
However, he blamed the tuai rumah for being unfair, since the BN had no way of proving which person did not vote for BN in the election.
SEW said another Iban man, who only wanted to be known as “Robin”, gave them a letter and expressed the residents’ anger against their tuai rumah, Mador Anak Rendah.
In the letter signed by ‘Disgruntled Voters’, the Sg Rasau voters said they felt deep regret that BN and SUPP failed to deliver their election promises.
“During the election eve, we were given RM100 each voter and later promised RM400 if the candidate wins in the election,” reads the letter.
However, when approached by SEW and Wong, these Iban voters refused to lodge police reports on the matter.
The reason they gave was “no point doing so”, since the police did not take any action despite some police reports lodged before.
BN retained its power in Sarawak in the April 16 state election with a two-thirds majority, while the opposition increased its seats from seven to 15. The Sarawak legislature has 71 seats.
Malaysiakini
Apr 26, 11
More than 100 Ibans stormed the Sibu headquarters of the Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP) yesterday, demanding the balance of RM400 a person as their reward promised for backing a party candidate who won in the recent state election, an election watchdog has revealed.
Sibu Election Watch (SEW) in a press statement released in the Sarawak town late yesterday evening said the Ibans were upset that they did not get the “balance”, despite being promised by SUPP election agents as well as the tuai rumah (longhouse headman) before polling day.
The incident was first reported by the web portal Sarawak Indigenous Community News and tweeted by DAP Sarawak chairman and Bukit Assek assemblyperson Wong Ho Leng (left), who was present at the site yesterday.
Soon after the news broke out, SEW sent two representatives to the Sibu SUPP headquarters to check out the situation.
Its probe, SEW said, showed that the Ibans were promised an upfront payment of RM100 before voting day on April 16 and if the SUPP candidate won, they would each be paid another RM400 after the election.
SEW said its representatives have witnessed Ibans from at least two longhouses being paid the “balance” of RM400 each.
The election watch said the Ibans were from Rumah Chandi, Rumah Pasang and Rumah Ujang.
When the SEW representatives were leaving the scene, it said, only the residents from Rumah Chandi and Rumah Pasang had collected the money from SUPP.
“One of the residents from Rumah Chandi even distributed a stack of RM100 bills to the longhouse folk holding their identity cards in front of us,” SEW said.
Quarrel with tuai rumah
SEW said it interviewed one Iban voter from Rumah Ujang, who revealed that the Iban folk had a quarrel with their tuai rumah for not getting their RM400 even a week after polling day.
“However, the tuai rumah hit back that some people had voted for DAP and did not deserve to get the RM400 balance,” said the young Iban man SEW quoted in its press statement.
However, he blamed the tuai rumah for being unfair, since the BN had no way of proving which person did not vote for BN in the election.
SEW said another Iban man, who only wanted to be known as “Robin”, gave them a letter and expressed the residents’ anger against their tuai rumah, Mador Anak Rendah.
In the letter signed by ‘Disgruntled Voters’, the Sg Rasau voters said they felt deep regret that BN and SUPP failed to deliver their election promises.
“During the election eve, we were given RM100 each voter and later promised RM400 if the candidate wins in the election,” reads the letter.
However, when approached by SEW and Wong, these Iban voters refused to lodge police reports on the matter.
The reason they gave was “no point doing so”, since the police did not take any action despite some police reports lodged before.
BN retained its power in Sarawak in the April 16 state election with a two-thirds majority, while the opposition increased its seats from seven to 15. The Sarawak legislature has 71 seats.
不满国阵代理胜选后扣钱不发 逾百伊班人涌至人联总部讨钱
http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/162429
2011年4月25日 傍晚 7点48分
虽然砂州选举早已落幕一周余，但却爆发疑似选民向胜选候选人讨取金钱的事件。选举监督组织诗巫选举监察员（Sibu Election Watchers）今日揭露，由于国阵代理人在胜选后扣钱不发，导致逾百名伊班选民今早蜂拥至人联党诗巫总部，以索取某候选人承诺中选后给予的“余款”。结果数个长屋的居民当场获得400令吉。
长屋代表当场派钱
此事最早是由《砂拉越原住民社区新闻》网站所揭露。
行动党砂州主席黄和联随后也到现场了解实况。他并在推特上表示，当时有大约100名来自拉骚（Sg Rasau）和峇旺阿山的伊班选民涌到人联党诗巫总部，要求领取400令吉的“余款”。
这些选民声称国阵代理人之前承诺给他们100令吉加400令吉，即选前该区的注册选民都可以获得100令吉，一旦国阵候选人获胜，便可以再获得400令吉。
诗巫选举监察员组织则在晚上发表文告，揭露事情的更多详情。
该组织是接获一名在报馆工作的朋友捎来消息，有很多土著聚集在人联党诗巫总部办公楼下面，并声称此事可能与刚过的选举承诺有关。
于是，该组织就派员到位于诗巫市区甘榜拿督路的人联党诗巫办公室查看，结果发现至少两个长屋，即Rumah Chandi与Rumah Pasang的居民已经领到每人400令吉的“余款”。
文告说，其中一名来自Rumah Chandi的代表，更是手里拿着好几张身份证，并当着众人面前取出多张100令吉的钞票，当场分给Rumah Chandi的居民。
附近咖啡店都爆满
文告表示，该组织两名监察员最初到场时，发现办公楼楼梯口确实有7、8名貌似土著的男性站着。虽然没有人群围聚，不过附近的多家咖啡店却人潮爆满，几乎都是土著，而且有数名警察混杂在当中。
文告说，两名监察员接着向现场的人潮查询，其中一名年轻人告诉他们，正在等着人联党发钱。
文告说，这名年轻男子是峇旺阿山的选民，来自Sg Rasau区的Rumah Ujang长屋。他向监察员揭露“昨天他们那一区的长屋居民发生争执，因为国阵代理人指某些居民把票投给行动党，所以不该获得400令吉（余款）。”
没投国阵拒发余款
诗巫选举监察员组织表示，这名拒绝透露姓名的男子不满地说，国阵没有证据证明哪一名选民没把票投给国阵，所以如此扣押不派钱，很不公平。
“他也说，国阵在竞选期间承诺会让砂拉越电供公司（Sesco）为长屋牵电，但目前他们还在使用发电机。”
文告也说，其中一名监察员接着走到二楼的人联党办公室，看到有6、7名土著正在办公室的大厅坐着。当监察员上前询问时，有两人回答说，他们等着领钱，其中一位表示其长屋屋主身体不适，所以他代表出席。
文告说，监察员也在楼下的咖啡店，访问到一名自称叫罗宾（Robin）的伊班男子。该名男子以为监察员是记者，于是主动交出一封署名“不满的选民”（Disgruntled Voters）的英文信件给他们。
屋主拒发钱引发争执
该封信函（左图）只有4段，内容是投诉国阵及人联党的代理人，即一名长屋屋主Mador Anak Rendah处事不公，也要求有关单位彻查选举的金钱政治。
文告说，监察员随后也访问一名来自Rumah Pasang长屋的男子Saoh Marong。他也是峇旺阿山的选民，他投诉该名代理人指他们把票投给行动党，以致100多人全部拿不到“余款”。
“据Saoh Marong所说，好几个长屋居民都来了，包括Rumah Pasang和Rumah Chand的居民。”
“当问到是谁通知他们来人联党诗巫支部等派钱时，他说是Mador叫他们来的。昨天，拉骚长屋区里有争吵，结果Mador终于在今早答应发还剩下的400令吉。”
毫无下文而拒绝报警
诗巫选举监察员组织文告指出，这名男子质问，发生这样的事情，谁该负责？是代理人还是该名人联党的候选人？
文告表示，这名男子相信扣钱不发并非国阵上头的命令，而是代理人自行决定。当进一步问起钱的来源时，他四两拨千斤地说，这他并不知道。
文告也说，这些人以曾经报警，但毫无下文为由，拒绝再次报警。
文告表示，在上午11点左右，行动党武吉阿瑟州议员黄和联曾到现场了解。当他获悉所有人都没有意愿向反贪污委员会报案，也没有记者在场时，便说“那是白费力气”。
文告说，在大约上午11点半，两名监察员准备离开之际，虽然Rumah Ujang的居民还没领到钱，不过来自Rumah Pasang 的Saoh Marong证实已经拿到相关的“余款”。
常青集团曾发生讨钱
较早前，《砂拉越原住民社区新闻》网站指出，这次的事情与多年前，数百名伊班选民涌到常青集团总部讨钱的情况类似。当时，一些未拿到钱的选民甚至跟公司职员打起来。
该网站强调，贿选双方都是有罪的，因此警方应该秉持法律对付涉嫌贿选的两方面人士。它也指出，警方没有义务协助涉及非法活动的任何一方。
在4月16日投票的砂州选举中，人联党的峇旺阿山候选人黄顺舸以1808张多数票，或7316张得票，击败来势汹汹的行动党候选人刘强燕。黄顺舸也是诗巫人联党唯一在州选中突围的华裔候选人。
2011年4月25日 傍晚 7点48分
虽然砂州选举早已落幕一周余，但却爆发疑似选民向胜选候选人讨取金钱的事件。选举监督组织诗巫选举监察员（Sibu Election Watchers）今日揭露，由于国阵代理人在胜选后扣钱不发，导致逾百名伊班选民今早蜂拥至人联党诗巫总部，以索取某候选人承诺中选后给予的“余款”。结果数个长屋的居民当场获得400令吉。
长屋代表当场派钱
此事最早是由《砂拉越原住民社区新闻》网站所揭露。
行动党砂州主席黄和联随后也到现场了解实况。他并在推特上表示，当时有大约100名来自拉骚（Sg Rasau）和峇旺阿山的伊班选民涌到人联党诗巫总部，要求领取400令吉的“余款”。
这些选民声称国阵代理人之前承诺给他们100令吉加400令吉，即选前该区的注册选民都可以获得100令吉，一旦国阵候选人获胜，便可以再获得400令吉。
诗巫选举监察员组织则在晚上发表文告，揭露事情的更多详情。
该组织是接获一名在报馆工作的朋友捎来消息，有很多土著聚集在人联党诗巫总部办公楼下面，并声称此事可能与刚过的选举承诺有关。
于是，该组织就派员到位于诗巫市区甘榜拿督路的人联党诗巫办公室查看，结果发现至少两个长屋，即Rumah Chandi与Rumah Pasang的居民已经领到每人400令吉的“余款”。
文告说，其中一名来自Rumah Chandi的代表，更是手里拿着好几张身份证，并当着众人面前取出多张100令吉的钞票，当场分给Rumah Chandi的居民。
附近咖啡店都爆满
文告表示，该组织两名监察员最初到场时，发现办公楼楼梯口确实有7、8名貌似土著的男性站着。虽然没有人群围聚，不过附近的多家咖啡店却人潮爆满，几乎都是土著，而且有数名警察混杂在当中。
文告说，两名监察员接着向现场的人潮查询，其中一名年轻人告诉他们，正在等着人联党发钱。
文告说，这名年轻男子是峇旺阿山的选民，来自Sg Rasau区的Rumah Ujang长屋。他向监察员揭露“昨天他们那一区的长屋居民发生争执，因为国阵代理人指某些居民把票投给行动党，所以不该获得400令吉（余款）。”
没投国阵拒发余款
诗巫选举监察员组织表示，这名拒绝透露姓名的男子不满地说，国阵没有证据证明哪一名选民没把票投给国阵，所以如此扣押不派钱，很不公平。
“他也说，国阵在竞选期间承诺会让砂拉越电供公司（Sesco）为长屋牵电，但目前他们还在使用发电机。”
文告也说，其中一名监察员接着走到二楼的人联党办公室，看到有6、7名土著正在办公室的大厅坐着。当监察员上前询问时，有两人回答说，他们等着领钱，其中一位表示其长屋屋主身体不适，所以他代表出席。
文告说，监察员也在楼下的咖啡店，访问到一名自称叫罗宾（Robin）的伊班男子。该名男子以为监察员是记者，于是主动交出一封署名“不满的选民”（Disgruntled Voters）的英文信件给他们。
屋主拒发钱引发争执
该封信函（左图）只有4段，内容是投诉国阵及人联党的代理人，即一名长屋屋主Mador Anak Rendah处事不公，也要求有关单位彻查选举的金钱政治。
文告说，监察员随后也访问一名来自Rumah Pasang长屋的男子Saoh Marong。他也是峇旺阿山的选民，他投诉该名代理人指他们把票投给行动党，以致100多人全部拿不到“余款”。
“据Saoh Marong所说，好几个长屋居民都来了，包括Rumah Pasang和Rumah Chand的居民。”
“当问到是谁通知他们来人联党诗巫支部等派钱时，他说是Mador叫他们来的。昨天，拉骚长屋区里有争吵，结果Mador终于在今早答应发还剩下的400令吉。”
毫无下文而拒绝报警
诗巫选举监察员组织文告指出，这名男子质问，发生这样的事情，谁该负责？是代理人还是该名人联党的候选人？
文告表示，这名男子相信扣钱不发并非国阵上头的命令，而是代理人自行决定。当进一步问起钱的来源时，他四两拨千斤地说，这他并不知道。
文告也说，这些人以曾经报警，但毫无下文为由，拒绝再次报警。
文告表示，在上午11点左右，行动党武吉阿瑟州议员黄和联曾到现场了解。当他获悉所有人都没有意愿向反贪污委员会报案，也没有记者在场时，便说“那是白费力气”。
文告说，在大约上午11点半，两名监察员准备离开之际，虽然Rumah Ujang的居民还没领到钱，不过来自Rumah Pasang 的Saoh Marong证实已经拿到相关的“余款”。
常青集团曾发生讨钱
较早前，《砂拉越原住民社区新闻》网站指出，这次的事情与多年前，数百名伊班选民涌到常青集团总部讨钱的情况类似。当时，一些未拿到钱的选民甚至跟公司职员打起来。
该网站强调，贿选双方都是有罪的，因此警方应该秉持法律对付涉嫌贿选的两方面人士。它也指出，警方没有义务协助涉及非法活动的任何一方。
在4月16日投票的砂州选举中，人联党的峇旺阿山候选人黄顺舸以1808张多数票，或7316张得票，击败来势汹汹的行动党候选人刘强燕。黄顺舸也是诗巫人联党唯一在州选中突围的华裔候选人。
Monday, April 25, 2011
Rafael Benítez ready to step into Carlo Ancelotti's Chelsea boots
Dominic Fifield
guardian.co.uk, Friday 22 April 2011 22.30 BST
Article history
It may be time for Rafael Benítez to return to Premier League managership - with Chelsea. Photograph: Matthew Childs/Action Images
Rafael Benítez will express an interest in managing Chelsea if Roman Abramovich, as anticipated, opts to part company with Carlo Ancelotti this summer.
The Spaniard, who spent six years at Liverpool and claimed the 2005 European Cup, has been out of work since being sacked by Internazionale in December after a disappointing six-month spell at San Siro. He has since returned to live on Merseyside and last week publicly expressed an interest in returning to management in the Premier League.
Chelsea would offer him an attractive opportunity at a club competing in the Champions League – the Londoners still harbour some hopes of retaining their league title – and the 51-year-old is understood to be keen to be considered should Ancelotti's two-year period in charge end next month. Abramovich and the club's chief executive, Ron Gourlay, will be aware of his interest but will not make a decision on the Italian's future before the end of the current campaign.
Benítez would represent a high-calibre candidate for the position given his availability and desire to work in England – "If I have good offers from abroad it will be OK, but my priority is to return to the Premier league," he said earlier this month – with his relationship with Fernando Torres, whom he originally signed for Liverpool from Atlético Madrid, being a further attraction. The pair remain in contact, with Benítez having suggested recently that the £50m forward, who has yet to score for Chelsea, would benefit from working with a Spanish manager.
Whether the Londoners' supporters would take as keenly to Benítez's potential candidature is more open to question given the fractious nature of games between Chelsea, particularly under José Mourinho, and Liverpool during his time on Merseyside. Yet Abramovich may consider the Spaniard's record in Europe – he also won a Uefa Cup with Valencia and lost to Ancelotti's Milan in the final of the 2007 Champions League – as compelling.
The lack of credible candidates to replace Ancelotti, particularly with Guus Hiddink unlikely to be considered for the managerial position, could yet lead to the Italian seeing out the final year of his contract at Stamford Bridge. The incumbent would like to remain at the club and his prospects would be enhanced should Chelsea extend their recent form.
Ancelotti, whose team entertain West Ham United tomorrow evening, remains only cautiously optimistic that the Premier League title can still be retained despite a run of six wins in seven matches that has seen Chelsea vault Arsenal into second place, albeit still six points from the summit. The Londoners are still to visit Old Trafford and will hope that United may yet be distracted by their imminent participation in the Champion League semi-finals against Schalke, and potentially a subsequent final, though Ancelotti is realistic.
"If we want to have a chance we have to think that we have to win every game," Ancelotti said. "We have to be honest with ourselves. I would like to be in United's position, six points ahead, because if they do not lose total control they will win [the title]. The title is in their hands – we have to be honest about that – but we also have to believe that we can win every game left, including at Old Trafford like we did last year.
"And our moment is good. It has been in the league, but also in the last 16 of the Champions League against Copenhagen it was good. We could have done better against United (in the quarter-finals), and we were close to doing better. But the team started to play well when we recovered our important players. When they came back to be fit, the team has started playing well again."
guardian.co.uk, Friday 22 April 2011 22.30 BST
Article history
It may be time for Rafael Benítez to return to Premier League managership - with Chelsea. Photograph: Matthew Childs/Action Images
Rafael Benítez will express an interest in managing Chelsea if Roman Abramovich, as anticipated, opts to part company with Carlo Ancelotti this summer.
The Spaniard, who spent six years at Liverpool and claimed the 2005 European Cup, has been out of work since being sacked by Internazionale in December after a disappointing six-month spell at San Siro. He has since returned to live on Merseyside and last week publicly expressed an interest in returning to management in the Premier League.
Chelsea would offer him an attractive opportunity at a club competing in the Champions League – the Londoners still harbour some hopes of retaining their league title – and the 51-year-old is understood to be keen to be considered should Ancelotti's two-year period in charge end next month. Abramovich and the club's chief executive, Ron Gourlay, will be aware of his interest but will not make a decision on the Italian's future before the end of the current campaign.
Benítez would represent a high-calibre candidate for the position given his availability and desire to work in England – "If I have good offers from abroad it will be OK, but my priority is to return to the Premier league," he said earlier this month – with his relationship with Fernando Torres, whom he originally signed for Liverpool from Atlético Madrid, being a further attraction. The pair remain in contact, with Benítez having suggested recently that the £50m forward, who has yet to score for Chelsea, would benefit from working with a Spanish manager.
Whether the Londoners' supporters would take as keenly to Benítez's potential candidature is more open to question given the fractious nature of games between Chelsea, particularly under José Mourinho, and Liverpool during his time on Merseyside. Yet Abramovich may consider the Spaniard's record in Europe – he also won a Uefa Cup with Valencia and lost to Ancelotti's Milan in the final of the 2007 Champions League – as compelling.
The lack of credible candidates to replace Ancelotti, particularly with Guus Hiddink unlikely to be considered for the managerial position, could yet lead to the Italian seeing out the final year of his contract at Stamford Bridge. The incumbent would like to remain at the club and his prospects would be enhanced should Chelsea extend their recent form.
Ancelotti, whose team entertain West Ham United tomorrow evening, remains only cautiously optimistic that the Premier League title can still be retained despite a run of six wins in seven matches that has seen Chelsea vault Arsenal into second place, albeit still six points from the summit. The Londoners are still to visit Old Trafford and will hope that United may yet be distracted by their imminent participation in the Champion League semi-finals against Schalke, and potentially a subsequent final, though Ancelotti is realistic.
"If we want to have a chance we have to think that we have to win every game," Ancelotti said. "We have to be honest with ourselves. I would like to be in United's position, six points ahead, because if they do not lose total control they will win [the title]. The title is in their hands – we have to be honest about that – but we also have to believe that we can win every game left, including at Old Trafford like we did last year.
"And our moment is good. It has been in the league, but also in the last 16 of the Champions League against Copenhagen it was good. We could have done better against United (in the quarter-finals), and we were close to doing better. But the team started to play well when we recovered our important players. When they came back to be fit, the team has started playing well again."
你是甚麼人？
http://opinions.sinchew-i.com/node/19072?tid=17
鄭丁賢‧你是甚麼人？
2011-04-25 09:05
在“一個馬來人，一個土著”，以及“以華制華”的破銅鑼聲中，發生了這起事件。
52歲的運輸業者王金根，兩星期前的一個深夜，開車經過吉隆坡中環公路安邦路段，目睹一起車禍；一輛小轎車翻覆，車內一對馬來夫婦，再納和羅莎米雅身受重傷，挾在車內。
他即刻下車，把再納移到路基，回身準備救羅莎米雅。
就在這時，一輛休旅車高速駛來，撞上王金根，拖行數公尺停下；司機眼見肇禍，踩油離去。
王金根和再納夫婦一起被送進醫院。
再納夫婦傷勢穩定，等候康復；王金根則昏迷不醒，右腳截肢。
撞後逃的休旅車司機，被確認是一名華裔。
兩星期來，王金根在死亡邊緣掙扎；他剩下的左腳遭細菌感染，也必須截除。
就在上星期五，他病況惡化，不治離世。
這是一個平凡人的偉大故事，或許，類似事件曾經出現其它車禍、火災、水災等事件，通常不會成為重大新聞，也不一定會引起注意。
但是，在有人鼓吹“一個馬來人，一個土著”，另一些人搬出“以華制華”的論調時，王金根的事件，不禁使我產生特別感觸，準確來說，是傷感和憤怒交陳。
王金根停車的時候，沒有先看挾在車內的是華人或馬來人；他看到的是危急中的兩個性命。
王金根救人的時候，沒有考慮傷者是華人或馬來人；他想到的是趕緊把他們移出車內。
不管是甚麼人，都是寶貴的生命；對生命一視同仁，同樣重視，那是人性的光輝。
我不知道《馬來西亞前鋒報》有沒有報導這條新聞，我也不清楚鼓吹種族論的阿旺士拉末和再尼哈山，若是讀到這條新聞，是否會有一丁點的感受。
但我想問，在再尼“一個馬來人，一個土著”的種族論調下，王金根下車時發現傷者是馬來人，他是否應該調頭而走？
而阿旺士拉末說“不應該照顧華人”，王金根有沒有想過，他不須要救再納夫婦，因為他們是馬來人？
王金根當然不會這麼做，因為他是一個有人性的馬來西亞人，他看的不是膚色，而是生命。
有一天，阿旺或再尼發生甚麼事故，有人來救他們時，他們會不會問說：“你是馬來人還是華人？”
同樣的，蔡細歷的“以華制華”論如果成立，那位休旅車華裔司機，當發現王金根是同膚色，基於同胞愛，應該即刻把王金根送入醫院，然後懺悔道歉，而不是撞後逃。
愚蠢的種族論調，愧對王金根偉大的精神。
星洲日報／馬荷加尼‧作者：鄭丁賢‧《星洲日報》副總編輯‧2011.04.25
鄭丁賢‧你是甚麼人？
2011-04-25 09:05
在“一個馬來人，一個土著”，以及“以華制華”的破銅鑼聲中，發生了這起事件。
52歲的運輸業者王金根，兩星期前的一個深夜，開車經過吉隆坡中環公路安邦路段，目睹一起車禍；一輛小轎車翻覆，車內一對馬來夫婦，再納和羅莎米雅身受重傷，挾在車內。
他即刻下車，把再納移到路基，回身準備救羅莎米雅。
就在這時，一輛休旅車高速駛來，撞上王金根，拖行數公尺停下；司機眼見肇禍，踩油離去。
王金根和再納夫婦一起被送進醫院。
再納夫婦傷勢穩定，等候康復；王金根則昏迷不醒，右腳截肢。
撞後逃的休旅車司機，被確認是一名華裔。
兩星期來，王金根在死亡邊緣掙扎；他剩下的左腳遭細菌感染，也必須截除。
就在上星期五，他病況惡化，不治離世。
這是一個平凡人的偉大故事，或許，類似事件曾經出現其它車禍、火災、水災等事件，通常不會成為重大新聞，也不一定會引起注意。
但是，在有人鼓吹“一個馬來人，一個土著”，另一些人搬出“以華制華”的論調時，王金根的事件，不禁使我產生特別感觸，準確來說，是傷感和憤怒交陳。
王金根停車的時候，沒有先看挾在車內的是華人或馬來人；他看到的是危急中的兩個性命。
王金根救人的時候，沒有考慮傷者是華人或馬來人；他想到的是趕緊把他們移出車內。
不管是甚麼人，都是寶貴的生命；對生命一視同仁，同樣重視，那是人性的光輝。
我不知道《馬來西亞前鋒報》有沒有報導這條新聞，我也不清楚鼓吹種族論的阿旺士拉末和再尼哈山，若是讀到這條新聞，是否會有一丁點的感受。
但我想問，在再尼“一個馬來人，一個土著”的種族論調下，王金根下車時發現傷者是馬來人，他是否應該調頭而走？
而阿旺士拉末說“不應該照顧華人”，王金根有沒有想過，他不須要救再納夫婦，因為他們是馬來人？
王金根當然不會這麼做，因為他是一個有人性的馬來西亞人，他看的不是膚色，而是生命。
有一天，阿旺或再尼發生甚麼事故，有人來救他們時，他們會不會問說：“你是馬來人還是華人？”
同樣的，蔡細歷的“以華制華”論如果成立，那位休旅車華裔司機，當發現王金根是同膚色，基於同胞愛，應該即刻把王金根送入醫院，然後懺悔道歉，而不是撞後逃。
愚蠢的種族論調，愧對王金根偉大的精神。
星洲日報／馬荷加尼‧作者：鄭丁賢‧《星洲日報》副總編輯‧2011.04.25
Kenny For Good?
http://tomkinstimes.com/2011/04/kenny-for-good/
Like most people, I expected Kenny Dalglish to give Liverpool a lift. While he wouldn’t have been my first choice last summer (due to his time out of the game), such was the depression surrounding the team by the autumn that it was crying out for someone inspirational and in touch with the club. If a caretaker was needed, he had to be the man.
But I probably didn’t expect such a positive impact, given he inherited a team lacking confidence and, as the season has progressed, a high number of injuries.
In just 14 league games Dalglish has easily surpassed Roy Hodgson’s points tally from his 20 (27 points compared with 25). In those 14 games, more goals have been scored than in the 20 under the predecessor. Ironically, clean sheets are occurring far more regularly than under the more defensive Hodgson. All this means that the goal difference has swung from a ghastly -3 to a very encouraging +12 since January.
But is it enough to secure a full-time return?
Managers need several things going for them. Few will have everything on their side; almost all will have weaknesses, because they are human beings. And as with most things in life, even good qualities will have a flip side; nothing is ever 100% right or wrong. If you’re a nice guy, some players may take advantage of you; if you’re a no-nonsense boss, it may lead to mutiny. No-one can be all things to all men, and modern squads tend to consist of every type of personality and nationality.
But if you look at several important categories, Kenny Dalglish ticks the boxes.
Experience
Logic tells us that experience helps with decision making. The more situations you’ve faced, the more of a memory bank you have to draw from, and recall what worked and what flunked. This leads to better instant judgements; see the excellent book ‘Blink’ by Malcolm Gladwell for how this works.
The experience of simply being an ex-player is not enough, though, because managers think differently to players. They have to think about the overall project, not simply their own part within it. It’s a holistic approach, and requires so many different strengths that even people who have never played the game can succeed to incredible levels. (Arrigo Saachi, a former shoe salesman, being the most famous example, having created one of the game’s great sides at AC Milan in the late ‘80s. “I never realised that in order to become a jockey you have to have been a horse first”, he once noted.)
Managers have to stake their reputations on buying and selling players; judgements footballers don’t have to make. They have to take responsibility for tactics, motivation and, of course, the results themselves. You need a feel for the game, which players obviously have, but there’s a lot more to it than simply that. You need communication skills and an analytical mind, which plenty of footballers lack.
Dalglish was one of the few successful player-managers when he first started out, and in the minority of world-class players who were just as successful in the dugout. But he was also aided by perhaps the most experienced back-room staff in football at the time, with the masterful Bob Paisley also on hand for advice. The squad was full of the ultimate winning experience – most had league titles and European Cup medals – and they knew Kenny well.
His initial problems related more to now being seen as their boss; but he was almost certainly the most revered player in the dressing room anyway. Mark Lawrenson noted that he soon felt put in his place by Dalglish when he was late for training. Phil Neal, overlooked for the role, sulked, and was quickly despatched. Dalglish was boss.
Now, 26 years later, Dalglish is brimming with experience. Despite a decade out of the dugout, he is the wise old head; particularly when compared with the other name that’s been bandied about in connection with the job, that of the precocious Andre Villas Boas.
Villas Boas is the 33-year-old Jose Mourinho/Bobby Robson protégé with an absolutely jaw-dropping 87% win percentage with Porto this season, and this after the club sold two of its best players (one being Raul Meireles). The club have already won the Portuguese league, and are into the Europa League semi-finals, having put 10 past Spartak Moscow over two legs (five home, five away). This comes just a year after his first managerial role, with second-tier Académica, who were bottom and winless when he took over in October last season, and ended up escaping relegation by ten points.
Of course, with 35 years in management, Roy Hodgson was the apotheosis of the ‘experience’ candidate in 2010. But it seems that the right kind of experience is just as vital. Different clubs come with different pressures; at Liverpool, it’s about living up to an incredible history, dealing with heavy expectation and appeasing one of the globe’s biggest sporting fan-bases. Coping with that weight is necessary.
It’s also about winning more than five out of every ten league games: something Shankly, Paisley, Fagan, Dalglish (first time around), Evans, Houllier and Benítez managed to do, and what Kenny is currently doing once more (for this seaso he equals Benítez’s overall average of 57%).
Souness and Hodgson, however, fell well short. Avoiding defeat is not enough. Hodgson had experience, but not a lot of it was with similar kinds of club; he had 35 years of needing to win a lower percentage of games each season to satisfy expectations. But the ‘35’ he gave us was his league win percentage.
With all this in mind, the dynamic Villas Boas demands serious consideration. To have achieved what he has, at such a young age, in two very different situations, shows a real gift. But it’s still hard to see anyone fitting in quite as well as Kenny Dalglish.
Symbiosis
In this context, symbiosis is the meeting of minds between the club, its fans and the manager. Perhaps this is an even bigger deal at Liverpool than most clubs, because of the legendary relationship between Bill Shankly and the Kop. The goodwill needs to flow from one to the other, and back again.
For almost 40 years, Liverpool fans knew for certain that the men managing their club got the institution. Every manager was either appointed from within, or an ex-player. Then arrived Frenchman Gérard Houllier. But even he had lived in Liverpool, and stood on the Kop as a young teacher. Upon arrival he said the right things.
Next up was Rafa Benítez, a Spaniard, but he understood the fans from day one (and continues to attend the Hillsborough memorial service); proving that you don’t have to be appointed from within, or from the city – just simply judge the situation correctly, and act to defend the club and its supporters whenever possible. He chose to join Liverpool after winning the Spanish title twice in three seasons – and added the Uefa Cup – and we felt honoured that someone so successful would wish to head our way. It felt like a good appointment.
The first man who failed to get onto the same wavelength as the fans was Roy Hodgson. There was some skepticism amongst the support at the outset, based on his lack of major achievements in the game, and his oft-noted desire to manage the English national side sooner rather than later. Many fans felt he was using the club as a stepping stone, although his allies described it as reward for years of hard work.
The initial press conferences were impressive, and skeptics (myself included) were being won over. But strange comments began appearing in pre-season, such as “I hope we don’t get beaten too heavily” before the friendly with Al Hilal, and “I hope we don’t get beaten 6-0” before the Premier League game at Man City in August. (I recently turned 40, and I’m not sure the Reds have lost by that margin in my lifetime. It also implies that losing 3-0 would be acceptable, and that was the final result.)
Red flags were everywhere, and I don’t mean on the Kop. Bottom-tier Northampton Town were described thus: “They’ll be a formidable challenge – there’s no question about that.” No wonder they arrived in good spirits. By all means don’t disrespect the opposition, but equally, don’t treat winnable games as missions impossible.
It wasn’t long before Hodgson criticised the fans protesting against the then-hated owners. He also seemed intent on putting his own reputation before that of the club. If it’s fair to say that the majority of fans were not exited by his appointment, he used up what goodwill there was by refusing to back his players in the face of criticism from Alex Ferguson, in amongst a succession of increasingly bizarre press conferences where the pressure appeared to be getting to him.
It’s easy to underestimate the importance of such comments, but fans are looking for leadership, and for a sense of symbiosis. Hodgson never endeared himself to the local press, or local-based national journalists. He gave his time to columnists at the nationals, who were his allies. In fact, if you were to write a set of rules of what not to do at a major football club, Hodgson provides a number of perfect examples. Hodgson demands mention, because he is the dark by which we now recognise the light.
And his comments about Kenny standing no chance of getting the job last summer because he himself was in the frame were never going to endear him to the Kop. He was the appointment of distrusted executives, who themselves were not in tune with the club and its supporters.
Perhaps most crucially, Hodgson also failed to understand how the fans expect the team to play, as evinced by a negative goal difference. No-one expected to finish in the top three, but as the club languished in the relegation zone in October, it was hard to argue, based on the quality seen on the pitch, that things were likely to improve to the required standard.
A manager has to be in tune with the supporters, and the club’s history and traditions. That doesn’t mean adhering to the tactics of 50 years ago, or matching improbable successes. But insulting the intelligence of fans by constantly lowering expectations beyond acceptable levels is not the act of someone in tune with his surroundings.
Instantly, Kenny Dalglish came in and spoke like a winner, even if no-one expected miracles. He said that the team was capable of going on a long winning run, but would be taking it one game at a time. There was no talk of hoping to avoid being thrashed. He spoke like a Liverpool manager.
The same ‘awful’ squad that Hodgson’s allies attacked was soon playing as well as any team in the country, and results dramatically improved. It wasn’t just that Dalglish was loved by the fans; he got what was required. It’s wrong to expect anyone else to be able to match what he offers in terms of his gravitas, but Houllier and Benítez proved that you don’t need to be from the boot room to get the fans on your side (for a fews years, at least).
Authority
I’ve written about this before, even going so far as to say that it’s possibly the most important aspect of management. It’s what leads players to believe in the man in the hot-seat, but it also relates to the situation above the manager; do the powers-that-be believe in him? It’s about credibility, trust, aura.
Players can sense lame duck managers, just as dogs can smell fear. They will exploit any weakness. Equally, they can respect those whose records demand it, and run through brick walls for them. Perhaps the most charismatic and authoritative manager is Jose Mourinho, yet his time at Chelsea faltered rapidly once he fell out with Roman Abramovich.
It doesn’t take much to lose that authority. Players will blame a manager before taking a good hard look at themselves. Rafa Benítez had a lot of authority at Liverpool between 2004 and 2009, but by 2010 a lot of it had evanesced.
Perhaps all relationships between players at managers reach a point of no return. As Jonathan Wilson notes, “The great Hungarian coach Bela Guttmann refused ever to spend longer than three years at a club because he felt that after that he could no longer motivate players.”
When Alex Ferguson sees his relationships break down – as seen with Beckham and Stam – he sells the player with impunity. His authority is such that no-one dare question him. But other managers – less embedded at a club, less successful, less powerful – would perhaps be the one to be shown the door ahead of a valuable star. The Manchester United players know who is boss, and that helps.
Imagine if Roy Hodgson had tried to sell Fernando Torres. There would have been mutiny amongst the fan base. And yet when it happened on Kenny Dalglish’s watch, we quickly got over the shock, and accepted that the striker was a bit of a fading force. There was not one iota of outrage directed at the new boss, or the owners (apart from a few of the cyberspace crazies).
Perhaps this shows double standards on our part. But it is a reflection of track records, not an arbitrary dislike of the Londoner.
In a recent Goal.com article, three of the worst 10 transfers of 2010/11 were Hodgson purchases: Joe Cole, Paul Konchesky and Christian Poulsen. Given that he only made six signings, this is some going. Brad Jones and Fabio Aurelio (due to injury) have also had little impact, although unlike the three selected, neither was bought for the first XI, and neither cost more than £2m. With all this in mind, no-one wanted to see who Hodgson would reinvest the £50m on, with visions of £20m spent on Carlton Cole.
The fact that Kenny could sell the star player – even if the decision may have been made for him (due to Torres wanting away, and FSG not wanting to keep unhappy assets) – and not suffer dissent shows the authority he holds in the eyes of the fans. And as the fans are less likely to get on his back, his authority is less likely to be diminished in the eyes of the players, who can tell from the crowd reaction how the boss is viewed. And none of the players need telling who Dalglish is, or what he means to the club.
Could any other manager have gained such a response in January? Had Dalglish gone back to work at Newcastle and sold Andy Carroll, he would probably have been castigated by the Toon army. But at Anfield he’s a protected species. This is not to say that he isn’t double-guessed and questioned, in the way that all supporters express doubts from time to time (even Ferguson gets it). But those doubts are left at the turnstiles.
And of course, if a manager is undermined from above, his authority is likewise weakened. In Benítez’s case, it was by Gillett, Hicks, Parry and Purslow.
In Hodgson’s case, such undermining was more inadvertent, when FSG appointed Damien Comolli as Director of Football.
However well-intended, the Director of Football position always undermines the in situ manager to at least some degree. It implies “I don’t trust you”, and British football folk are particularly distrusting of the role. The British management culture is sole control. But it’s understandable why FSG, as newcomers, would baulk at handing over tens of millions of transfer kitty to a man they didn’t appoint; or, indeed, to any single individual.
Their intention was to turn to the wisdom of crowds, and spread the responsibility in scouting and securing players, by bringing in an expert in the buying of players (or at least someone who shared their methodology in analysing performance). But it’s always a PR blow to the manager, and perhaps puts doubt into the minds of some players as to who is calling the shots. Given the innate ‘threatening’ nature of the DoF, the manager needs to be seen as strong and commanding in the eyes of the players, fans and media.
Kenny Dalglish, even as a mere caretaker, has that authority. It helps that he took the role knowing that Comolli was already in place; therefore, no-one could say that he was undermined. But even so, he has clout.
If anything, time has eased some doubts that surrounded the legend towards the end of his first spell in charge.
By 1991, his penchant for excluding top-scorer Peter Beardsley, along with his proclivity to play a number of ‘defenders’ in midfield – not to mention buying the aging David Speedie and the hapless Jimmy Carter – had plenty of fans scratching their heads. But this is a different beast: older, wiser, and not living under the cloud of Hillsborough.
Tactical acumen
Tactics clearly play an important part in modern football. But if a manager is a lame duck, it doesn’t matter what formation he plays; the players have to respond, and so does the crowd, and that becomes all the less likely if there is a lack of trust and a sense of uncertainty. Rafa Benítez didn’t become a worse tactician overnight, but some of the players had stopped responding in the way they once had. (Hodgson never really got some of them going to start with, and his tactics were horribly flawed to deal with the expectations.)
Next season, tactics will perhaps play a bigger part for Dalglish, if he gets the job on a full-time basis.
Team spirit and togetherness is perhaps the most vital component for getting out of a slump, and Dalglish engendered that. He has managed the players incredibly well, and that is far easier to do if you are a living legend. But tactical naivety can just as easily undo all that good work, and thankfully there’s been no sign of that.
From the moment he reclaimed his puffy manager’s jacket, Dalglish showed he understood the abilities of the players at the club better than his predecessor. He also showed far more versatility, switching from 4-2-3-1 to 3-5-2 and finally settling on a 4-4-1-1 that could easily be viewed as 4-3-3 with Suarez pulling left and Kuyt to the right, either side of Andy Carroll.
Where Hodgson tried to force things into his flat 4-4-2, Dalglish found success with players operating between the lines. Where Hodgson preferred pure defenders like Kyrgiakos, Skrtel and Konchesky, Dalglish knew that the likes of Agger, Johnson, Aurelio and Kelly were vital in order to dominate possession and take the game to the opposition.
The only criticism would be a couple of games in which Andy Carroll was targeted with long balls from the back, but on the whole, the football has been fluid and inventive, whatever the formation and whatever the personnel.
Carroll won’t be as effective as a goal threat until there’s better service from wide areas, although with Kuyt likely to keep his place on the right, where he guarantees double figures for the season, the team only needs one winger.
(In the modern game, full-backs often provide a lot of crosses, and this is something the likes of Johnson, Kelly and Aurelio can do.) And Carroll can bring others into the game; he’s not just there to get on the end of crosses. (I covered some of the tactical issues in more depth here, including how the addition of pace will alter how the team can set up.)
Of course, the credit for the revival must be shared with Steve Clarke. While Kenny is canny with a chalkboard, Clarke is seen by many to be the driving force behind the tactical side of things. But it doesn’t really matter who is the ideas man, so long as the manager is seen to be in charge, and everyone is seen to be singing from the same hymn sheet. Clarke behind by a less-commanding figure would not have the same effect.
The key is to have the entire skill-set covered by the management team, and that appears to be the case right now. Add the less quantifiable qualities, like symbiosis, respect and authority, and it’s hard to think of anyone better suited to the Liverpool job right now.
Like most people, I expected Kenny Dalglish to give Liverpool a lift. While he wouldn’t have been my first choice last summer (due to his time out of the game), such was the depression surrounding the team by the autumn that it was crying out for someone inspirational and in touch with the club. If a caretaker was needed, he had to be the man.
But I probably didn’t expect such a positive impact, given he inherited a team lacking confidence and, as the season has progressed, a high number of injuries.
In just 14 league games Dalglish has easily surpassed Roy Hodgson’s points tally from his 20 (27 points compared with 25). In those 14 games, more goals have been scored than in the 20 under the predecessor. Ironically, clean sheets are occurring far more regularly than under the more defensive Hodgson. All this means that the goal difference has swung from a ghastly -3 to a very encouraging +12 since January.
But is it enough to secure a full-time return?
Managers need several things going for them. Few will have everything on their side; almost all will have weaknesses, because they are human beings. And as with most things in life, even good qualities will have a flip side; nothing is ever 100% right or wrong. If you’re a nice guy, some players may take advantage of you; if you’re a no-nonsense boss, it may lead to mutiny. No-one can be all things to all men, and modern squads tend to consist of every type of personality and nationality.
But if you look at several important categories, Kenny Dalglish ticks the boxes.
Experience
Logic tells us that experience helps with decision making. The more situations you’ve faced, the more of a memory bank you have to draw from, and recall what worked and what flunked. This leads to better instant judgements; see the excellent book ‘Blink’ by Malcolm Gladwell for how this works.
The experience of simply being an ex-player is not enough, though, because managers think differently to players. They have to think about the overall project, not simply their own part within it. It’s a holistic approach, and requires so many different strengths that even people who have never played the game can succeed to incredible levels. (Arrigo Saachi, a former shoe salesman, being the most famous example, having created one of the game’s great sides at AC Milan in the late ‘80s. “I never realised that in order to become a jockey you have to have been a horse first”, he once noted.)
Managers have to stake their reputations on buying and selling players; judgements footballers don’t have to make. They have to take responsibility for tactics, motivation and, of course, the results themselves. You need a feel for the game, which players obviously have, but there’s a lot more to it than simply that. You need communication skills and an analytical mind, which plenty of footballers lack.
Dalglish was one of the few successful player-managers when he first started out, and in the minority of world-class players who were just as successful in the dugout. But he was also aided by perhaps the most experienced back-room staff in football at the time, with the masterful Bob Paisley also on hand for advice. The squad was full of the ultimate winning experience – most had league titles and European Cup medals – and they knew Kenny well.
His initial problems related more to now being seen as their boss; but he was almost certainly the most revered player in the dressing room anyway. Mark Lawrenson noted that he soon felt put in his place by Dalglish when he was late for training. Phil Neal, overlooked for the role, sulked, and was quickly despatched. Dalglish was boss.
Now, 26 years later, Dalglish is brimming with experience. Despite a decade out of the dugout, he is the wise old head; particularly when compared with the other name that’s been bandied about in connection with the job, that of the precocious Andre Villas Boas.
Villas Boas is the 33-year-old Jose Mourinho/Bobby Robson protégé with an absolutely jaw-dropping 87% win percentage with Porto this season, and this after the club sold two of its best players (one being Raul Meireles). The club have already won the Portuguese league, and are into the Europa League semi-finals, having put 10 past Spartak Moscow over two legs (five home, five away). This comes just a year after his first managerial role, with second-tier Académica, who were bottom and winless when he took over in October last season, and ended up escaping relegation by ten points.
Of course, with 35 years in management, Roy Hodgson was the apotheosis of the ‘experience’ candidate in 2010. But it seems that the right kind of experience is just as vital. Different clubs come with different pressures; at Liverpool, it’s about living up to an incredible history, dealing with heavy expectation and appeasing one of the globe’s biggest sporting fan-bases. Coping with that weight is necessary.
It’s also about winning more than five out of every ten league games: something Shankly, Paisley, Fagan, Dalglish (first time around), Evans, Houllier and Benítez managed to do, and what Kenny is currently doing once more (for this seaso he equals Benítez’s overall average of 57%).
Souness and Hodgson, however, fell well short. Avoiding defeat is not enough. Hodgson had experience, but not a lot of it was with similar kinds of club; he had 35 years of needing to win a lower percentage of games each season to satisfy expectations. But the ‘35’ he gave us was his league win percentage.
With all this in mind, the dynamic Villas Boas demands serious consideration. To have achieved what he has, at such a young age, in two very different situations, shows a real gift. But it’s still hard to see anyone fitting in quite as well as Kenny Dalglish.
Symbiosis
In this context, symbiosis is the meeting of minds between the club, its fans and the manager. Perhaps this is an even bigger deal at Liverpool than most clubs, because of the legendary relationship between Bill Shankly and the Kop. The goodwill needs to flow from one to the other, and back again.
For almost 40 years, Liverpool fans knew for certain that the men managing their club got the institution. Every manager was either appointed from within, or an ex-player. Then arrived Frenchman Gérard Houllier. But even he had lived in Liverpool, and stood on the Kop as a young teacher. Upon arrival he said the right things.
Next up was Rafa Benítez, a Spaniard, but he understood the fans from day one (and continues to attend the Hillsborough memorial service); proving that you don’t have to be appointed from within, or from the city – just simply judge the situation correctly, and act to defend the club and its supporters whenever possible. He chose to join Liverpool after winning the Spanish title twice in three seasons – and added the Uefa Cup – and we felt honoured that someone so successful would wish to head our way. It felt like a good appointment.
The first man who failed to get onto the same wavelength as the fans was Roy Hodgson. There was some skepticism amongst the support at the outset, based on his lack of major achievements in the game, and his oft-noted desire to manage the English national side sooner rather than later. Many fans felt he was using the club as a stepping stone, although his allies described it as reward for years of hard work.
The initial press conferences were impressive, and skeptics (myself included) were being won over. But strange comments began appearing in pre-season, such as “I hope we don’t get beaten too heavily” before the friendly with Al Hilal, and “I hope we don’t get beaten 6-0” before the Premier League game at Man City in August. (I recently turned 40, and I’m not sure the Reds have lost by that margin in my lifetime. It also implies that losing 3-0 would be acceptable, and that was the final result.)
Red flags were everywhere, and I don’t mean on the Kop. Bottom-tier Northampton Town were described thus: “They’ll be a formidable challenge – there’s no question about that.” No wonder they arrived in good spirits. By all means don’t disrespect the opposition, but equally, don’t treat winnable games as missions impossible.
It wasn’t long before Hodgson criticised the fans protesting against the then-hated owners. He also seemed intent on putting his own reputation before that of the club. If it’s fair to say that the majority of fans were not exited by his appointment, he used up what goodwill there was by refusing to back his players in the face of criticism from Alex Ferguson, in amongst a succession of increasingly bizarre press conferences where the pressure appeared to be getting to him.
It’s easy to underestimate the importance of such comments, but fans are looking for leadership, and for a sense of symbiosis. Hodgson never endeared himself to the local press, or local-based national journalists. He gave his time to columnists at the nationals, who were his allies. In fact, if you were to write a set of rules of what not to do at a major football club, Hodgson provides a number of perfect examples. Hodgson demands mention, because he is the dark by which we now recognise the light.
And his comments about Kenny standing no chance of getting the job last summer because he himself was in the frame were never going to endear him to the Kop. He was the appointment of distrusted executives, who themselves were not in tune with the club and its supporters.
Perhaps most crucially, Hodgson also failed to understand how the fans expect the team to play, as evinced by a negative goal difference. No-one expected to finish in the top three, but as the club languished in the relegation zone in October, it was hard to argue, based on the quality seen on the pitch, that things were likely to improve to the required standard.
A manager has to be in tune with the supporters, and the club’s history and traditions. That doesn’t mean adhering to the tactics of 50 years ago, or matching improbable successes. But insulting the intelligence of fans by constantly lowering expectations beyond acceptable levels is not the act of someone in tune with his surroundings.
Instantly, Kenny Dalglish came in and spoke like a winner, even if no-one expected miracles. He said that the team was capable of going on a long winning run, but would be taking it one game at a time. There was no talk of hoping to avoid being thrashed. He spoke like a Liverpool manager.
The same ‘awful’ squad that Hodgson’s allies attacked was soon playing as well as any team in the country, and results dramatically improved. It wasn’t just that Dalglish was loved by the fans; he got what was required. It’s wrong to expect anyone else to be able to match what he offers in terms of his gravitas, but Houllier and Benítez proved that you don’t need to be from the boot room to get the fans on your side (for a fews years, at least).
Authority
I’ve written about this before, even going so far as to say that it’s possibly the most important aspect of management. It’s what leads players to believe in the man in the hot-seat, but it also relates to the situation above the manager; do the powers-that-be believe in him? It’s about credibility, trust, aura.
Players can sense lame duck managers, just as dogs can smell fear. They will exploit any weakness. Equally, they can respect those whose records demand it, and run through brick walls for them. Perhaps the most charismatic and authoritative manager is Jose Mourinho, yet his time at Chelsea faltered rapidly once he fell out with Roman Abramovich.
It doesn’t take much to lose that authority. Players will blame a manager before taking a good hard look at themselves. Rafa Benítez had a lot of authority at Liverpool between 2004 and 2009, but by 2010 a lot of it had evanesced.
Perhaps all relationships between players at managers reach a point of no return. As Jonathan Wilson notes, “The great Hungarian coach Bela Guttmann refused ever to spend longer than three years at a club because he felt that after that he could no longer motivate players.”
When Alex Ferguson sees his relationships break down – as seen with Beckham and Stam – he sells the player with impunity. His authority is such that no-one dare question him. But other managers – less embedded at a club, less successful, less powerful – would perhaps be the one to be shown the door ahead of a valuable star. The Manchester United players know who is boss, and that helps.
Imagine if Roy Hodgson had tried to sell Fernando Torres. There would have been mutiny amongst the fan base. And yet when it happened on Kenny Dalglish’s watch, we quickly got over the shock, and accepted that the striker was a bit of a fading force. There was not one iota of outrage directed at the new boss, or the owners (apart from a few of the cyberspace crazies).
Perhaps this shows double standards on our part. But it is a reflection of track records, not an arbitrary dislike of the Londoner.
In a recent Goal.com article, three of the worst 10 transfers of 2010/11 were Hodgson purchases: Joe Cole, Paul Konchesky and Christian Poulsen. Given that he only made six signings, this is some going. Brad Jones and Fabio Aurelio (due to injury) have also had little impact, although unlike the three selected, neither was bought for the first XI, and neither cost more than £2m. With all this in mind, no-one wanted to see who Hodgson would reinvest the £50m on, with visions of £20m spent on Carlton Cole.
The fact that Kenny could sell the star player – even if the decision may have been made for him (due to Torres wanting away, and FSG not wanting to keep unhappy assets) – and not suffer dissent shows the authority he holds in the eyes of the fans. And as the fans are less likely to get on his back, his authority is less likely to be diminished in the eyes of the players, who can tell from the crowd reaction how the boss is viewed. And none of the players need telling who Dalglish is, or what he means to the club.
Could any other manager have gained such a response in January? Had Dalglish gone back to work at Newcastle and sold Andy Carroll, he would probably have been castigated by the Toon army. But at Anfield he’s a protected species. This is not to say that he isn’t double-guessed and questioned, in the way that all supporters express doubts from time to time (even Ferguson gets it). But those doubts are left at the turnstiles.
And of course, if a manager is undermined from above, his authority is likewise weakened. In Benítez’s case, it was by Gillett, Hicks, Parry and Purslow.
In Hodgson’s case, such undermining was more inadvertent, when FSG appointed Damien Comolli as Director of Football.
However well-intended, the Director of Football position always undermines the in situ manager to at least some degree. It implies “I don’t trust you”, and British football folk are particularly distrusting of the role. The British management culture is sole control. But it’s understandable why FSG, as newcomers, would baulk at handing over tens of millions of transfer kitty to a man they didn’t appoint; or, indeed, to any single individual.
Their intention was to turn to the wisdom of crowds, and spread the responsibility in scouting and securing players, by bringing in an expert in the buying of players (or at least someone who shared their methodology in analysing performance). But it’s always a PR blow to the manager, and perhaps puts doubt into the minds of some players as to who is calling the shots. Given the innate ‘threatening’ nature of the DoF, the manager needs to be seen as strong and commanding in the eyes of the players, fans and media.
Kenny Dalglish, even as a mere caretaker, has that authority. It helps that he took the role knowing that Comolli was already in place; therefore, no-one could say that he was undermined. But even so, he has clout.
If anything, time has eased some doubts that surrounded the legend towards the end of his first spell in charge.
By 1991, his penchant for excluding top-scorer Peter Beardsley, along with his proclivity to play a number of ‘defenders’ in midfield – not to mention buying the aging David Speedie and the hapless Jimmy Carter – had plenty of fans scratching their heads. But this is a different beast: older, wiser, and not living under the cloud of Hillsborough.
Tactical acumen
Tactics clearly play an important part in modern football. But if a manager is a lame duck, it doesn’t matter what formation he plays; the players have to respond, and so does the crowd, and that becomes all the less likely if there is a lack of trust and a sense of uncertainty. Rafa Benítez didn’t become a worse tactician overnight, but some of the players had stopped responding in the way they once had. (Hodgson never really got some of them going to start with, and his tactics were horribly flawed to deal with the expectations.)
Next season, tactics will perhaps play a bigger part for Dalglish, if he gets the job on a full-time basis.
Team spirit and togetherness is perhaps the most vital component for getting out of a slump, and Dalglish engendered that. He has managed the players incredibly well, and that is far easier to do if you are a living legend. But tactical naivety can just as easily undo all that good work, and thankfully there’s been no sign of that.
From the moment he reclaimed his puffy manager’s jacket, Dalglish showed he understood the abilities of the players at the club better than his predecessor. He also showed far more versatility, switching from 4-2-3-1 to 3-5-2 and finally settling on a 4-4-1-1 that could easily be viewed as 4-3-3 with Suarez pulling left and Kuyt to the right, either side of Andy Carroll.
Where Hodgson tried to force things into his flat 4-4-2, Dalglish found success with players operating between the lines. Where Hodgson preferred pure defenders like Kyrgiakos, Skrtel and Konchesky, Dalglish knew that the likes of Agger, Johnson, Aurelio and Kelly were vital in order to dominate possession and take the game to the opposition.
The only criticism would be a couple of games in which Andy Carroll was targeted with long balls from the back, but on the whole, the football has been fluid and inventive, whatever the formation and whatever the personnel.
Carroll won’t be as effective as a goal threat until there’s better service from wide areas, although with Kuyt likely to keep his place on the right, where he guarantees double figures for the season, the team only needs one winger.
(In the modern game, full-backs often provide a lot of crosses, and this is something the likes of Johnson, Kelly and Aurelio can do.) And Carroll can bring others into the game; he’s not just there to get on the end of crosses. (I covered some of the tactical issues in more depth here, including how the addition of pace will alter how the team can set up.)
Of course, the credit for the revival must be shared with Steve Clarke. While Kenny is canny with a chalkboard, Clarke is seen by many to be the driving force behind the tactical side of things. But it doesn’t really matter who is the ideas man, so long as the manager is seen to be in charge, and everyone is seen to be singing from the same hymn sheet. Clarke behind by a less-commanding figure would not have the same effect.
The key is to have the entire skill-set covered by the management team, and that appears to be the case right now. Add the less quantifiable qualities, like symbiosis, respect and authority, and it’s hard to think of anyone better suited to the Liverpool job right now.
Sunday, April 24, 2011
Did you hear about the Bidayuh who voted for DAP?
http://blog.limkitsiang.com/2011/04/22/did-you-hear-about-the-bidayuh-who-voted-for-dap/
By June Rubis
April 22, 2011
We were like a bad bar joke: two Bidayuhs, a Lun Bawang, an Iban, and two Malays walk into a DAP ceramah in Kuching. The crowd is mostly Chinese, and the speeches so far are all in Mandarin.
“I don’t understand what they are saying,” I complain to my fellow Bidayuh.
“Neither do we, and that is why we drink,” he replies, handing me a can of beer.
The next day is Election Day for Sarawak, and we, the motley crew representing the urban non-Chinese, cast our votes for DAP.
Times have changed for urban Sarawakians who all this while have embraced DAP as a home-grown party despite it having its origins in West Malaysia. We have seen the party struggle to grab a foothold in the state political arena for many decades.
It may be a Chinese-based party but for many of us urban voters, it represents the best possible choice for change of a state governance that we have grown weary of. Plus, you have to admit, their mascot is very cun.
Unsurprisingly, DAP has done very well in the urban areas (and 30,000 Ubah plush toys have sold out in less than two weeks), and soon everyone’s jumping on the bandwagon about how the Sarawak Chinese have rejected Barisan Nasional.
I jokingly tweet about feeling neglected as an urban Dayak who had voted for “ubah”, and how the Chinese are getting all the credit.
And then, it starts to get a bit nasty. The Chinese community in Sarawak are accused of rejecting multi-racialism. Seriously?
I ask you, pick any Sarawak Chinese and ask them whether they have indigenous relatives, either by blood or marriage, and they will answer you in the affirmative. Sarawakians are a plural society, and we are proud of it. We may identify ourselves as Chinese, Bidayuh or Lun Bawang but at the heart of it, we are always Sarawakians first.
Blaming the divide between the urban and rural votes in the state election on race is lazy analysis.
It is all too easy to blame a group of people — either the Chinese for “rejecting multi-racialism” and voting for DAP, or the rural indigenous population for being “short-sighted, and naive” and voting for BN — than to acknowledge the real issues on the ground.
Let us put aside, for now, the obvious vote-buying, intimidation, trickery and unfairness during the electoral process that we all know happened during the election.
What we have to acknowledge and try to understand is that for the most part, the rural population still identify and support BN as the only genuine state government. Dismissing the voting results from the rural areas to the corruption process is simplistic and lazy because it absolves do-gooders from having to go on the ground, and try to understand why the rural peoples feel beholden to BN. We need to go beyond tweeting/facebooking/blogging about our outrage of the state election results.
Years of indoctrination cannot be undone in one state election, yet please do not mistake me for being dismissive about the results.
As a Sarawakian who has lived most of her life in this state, I am quite happy with the outcome. We may not have the government that we had hoped for but yet 45 per cent of my fellow Sarawakians voted for a change of government.
And this has given me hope.
I acknowledge that Pakatan Rakyat has given Sarawak a collective hope that we have not seen in years. That a change of government is indeed possible.
It is not the fiery speeches from the ceramahs that has inspired me per se, but the thousands of my people — Chinese, Bidayuh, Melanau, Iban, Malay — that came out despite the fear of being seen as “opposition”.
And now we, urbanites of Sarawak, ARE the opposition. There is some beauty in this.
For those two short weeks of intense campaigning, I would hope that those who came from West Malaysia with the genuine intent to help Sarawak, had a quick glimpse at what we have lived with for the past 30 years. You may not understand why we see things the way we do, but I do hope that this is the beginning of what will be a long process of trying to understand and help.
To my fellow Sarawakians who were outraged with how our brothers and sisters came from West Malaysia with their own ideas of doing things, let us at least acknowledge that their abrasiveness, lack of protocol, enthusiasm, and yes, naiveté, of how things work in Sarawak, and overcome our own inhibitions of “this is just how things are”. They helped us get our voices back. Their speeches, while at times biased towards West Malaysian issues, inspired us so that we too can speak out, loud and proud, and not be afraid. And yes, a lot of us were afraid for many years.
Instead of being angry and outraged at the huge interest in Sarawak, let us use this to inspire ourselves to be more involved in our state issues.
We do not like how the West Malaysians are doing things? Then let us lead the way.
Let us find the humility that there are still things we need to learn. Do not worry about the condescension that they sometimes show towards us. I am beginning to realise lately that it is more of their reflection of fear and confusion than anything else.
There is so much to do for Sarawak, on the political and civil society front, and we have to realise that it starts with us Sarawakians, but we do not have to do it alone.
And maybe, one day, we can move on beyond being a bad bar joke, and prove to the rest of the country that when we cast our votes, we indeed cast our votes for the representatives that we felt were best suited for the job, and not because of the colour of her skin.
* June is very sad that she did not manage to get an Ubah plush toy.
By June Rubis
April 22, 2011
We were like a bad bar joke: two Bidayuhs, a Lun Bawang, an Iban, and two Malays walk into a DAP ceramah in Kuching. The crowd is mostly Chinese, and the speeches so far are all in Mandarin.
“I don’t understand what they are saying,” I complain to my fellow Bidayuh.
“Neither do we, and that is why we drink,” he replies, handing me a can of beer.
The next day is Election Day for Sarawak, and we, the motley crew representing the urban non-Chinese, cast our votes for DAP.
Times have changed for urban Sarawakians who all this while have embraced DAP as a home-grown party despite it having its origins in West Malaysia. We have seen the party struggle to grab a foothold in the state political arena for many decades.
It may be a Chinese-based party but for many of us urban voters, it represents the best possible choice for change of a state governance that we have grown weary of. Plus, you have to admit, their mascot is very cun.
Unsurprisingly, DAP has done very well in the urban areas (and 30,000 Ubah plush toys have sold out in less than two weeks), and soon everyone’s jumping on the bandwagon about how the Sarawak Chinese have rejected Barisan Nasional.
I jokingly tweet about feeling neglected as an urban Dayak who had voted for “ubah”, and how the Chinese are getting all the credit.
And then, it starts to get a bit nasty. The Chinese community in Sarawak are accused of rejecting multi-racialism. Seriously?
I ask you, pick any Sarawak Chinese and ask them whether they have indigenous relatives, either by blood or marriage, and they will answer you in the affirmative. Sarawakians are a plural society, and we are proud of it. We may identify ourselves as Chinese, Bidayuh or Lun Bawang but at the heart of it, we are always Sarawakians first.
Blaming the divide between the urban and rural votes in the state election on race is lazy analysis.
It is all too easy to blame a group of people — either the Chinese for “rejecting multi-racialism” and voting for DAP, or the rural indigenous population for being “short-sighted, and naive” and voting for BN — than to acknowledge the real issues on the ground.
Let us put aside, for now, the obvious vote-buying, intimidation, trickery and unfairness during the electoral process that we all know happened during the election.
What we have to acknowledge and try to understand is that for the most part, the rural population still identify and support BN as the only genuine state government. Dismissing the voting results from the rural areas to the corruption process is simplistic and lazy because it absolves do-gooders from having to go on the ground, and try to understand why the rural peoples feel beholden to BN. We need to go beyond tweeting/facebooking/blogging about our outrage of the state election results.
Years of indoctrination cannot be undone in one state election, yet please do not mistake me for being dismissive about the results.
As a Sarawakian who has lived most of her life in this state, I am quite happy with the outcome. We may not have the government that we had hoped for but yet 45 per cent of my fellow Sarawakians voted for a change of government.
And this has given me hope.
I acknowledge that Pakatan Rakyat has given Sarawak a collective hope that we have not seen in years. That a change of government is indeed possible.
It is not the fiery speeches from the ceramahs that has inspired me per se, but the thousands of my people — Chinese, Bidayuh, Melanau, Iban, Malay — that came out despite the fear of being seen as “opposition”.
And now we, urbanites of Sarawak, ARE the opposition. There is some beauty in this.
For those two short weeks of intense campaigning, I would hope that those who came from West Malaysia with the genuine intent to help Sarawak, had a quick glimpse at what we have lived with for the past 30 years. You may not understand why we see things the way we do, but I do hope that this is the beginning of what will be a long process of trying to understand and help.
To my fellow Sarawakians who were outraged with how our brothers and sisters came from West Malaysia with their own ideas of doing things, let us at least acknowledge that their abrasiveness, lack of protocol, enthusiasm, and yes, naiveté, of how things work in Sarawak, and overcome our own inhibitions of “this is just how things are”. They helped us get our voices back. Their speeches, while at times biased towards West Malaysian issues, inspired us so that we too can speak out, loud and proud, and not be afraid. And yes, a lot of us were afraid for many years.
Instead of being angry and outraged at the huge interest in Sarawak, let us use this to inspire ourselves to be more involved in our state issues.
We do not like how the West Malaysians are doing things? Then let us lead the way.
Let us find the humility that there are still things we need to learn. Do not worry about the condescension that they sometimes show towards us. I am beginning to realise lately that it is more of their reflection of fear and confusion than anything else.
There is so much to do for Sarawak, on the political and civil society front, and we have to realise that it starts with us Sarawakians, but we do not have to do it alone.
And maybe, one day, we can move on beyond being a bad bar joke, and prove to the rest of the country that when we cast our votes, we indeed cast our votes for the representatives that we felt were best suited for the job, and not because of the colour of her skin.
* June is very sad that she did not manage to get an Ubah plush toy.
Saturday, April 23, 2011
Urban bumis also swing to opposition
http://blog.limkitsiang.com/2011/04/20/urban-bumis-also-swing-to-opposition/
By Wong Teck Chi | Malaysiakini
On top of a huge swing of nearly 40 percent of Chinese voters to Pakatan Rakyat in Miri, a smaller proportion of urban or suburban bumiputera voters has turned to the opposition coalition, which resulted in SUPP losing almost all three state seats in Miri three days ago.
However, the magnitude of the swing is hard to estimate, given that there is no single area in Miri with a super majority of bumiputera voters.
The best example which showed there is some swing to Pakatan among the bumiputera community is Senadin, which is located on the outskirts of Miri.
Despite that that the seat has a mix of 49.98% Chinese, 28.97% Malay or Melanau and 15.88 % Iban, PKR candidate Michael Teo was still able to slash the majority of SUPP incumbent Lee Kim Sin from 4,799 votes in the 2006 state election to just 58 votes.
If not for the controversial postal votes that numbered around 1,000, SUPP would definitely have lost Senadin, and the party would have been totally wiped out from Sarawak’s second largest city.
In a further analysis into the results at Senadin’s polling districts, Malaysiakini has also found that PKR almost won at Kuala Baram despite the constituency having only 37.19% of Chinese, who are considered largely pro-opposition.
There are 31.35% Malay/Melanau voters and 24.46% Iban in Kuala Baram, but PKR still managed to get 47.25% of votes, showing that the multiracial party also got significant support from the bumiputera community in this election.
Beside Senadin, two other state seats – Piasau and Pujut under the Miri parliamentary seat – also showed a similar trend and the Iban swing was more obvious.
Within Piasau’s Lutong polling district, which has the highest number of Iban voters (40.63%), DAP’s popularity has increased tremendously to 56.73%, a jump of 23.06% from 33.67% in the last state election.
Surge in DAP’s popularity
In two other Malay/Melanau majority polling districts – Permaisuri (50.1% Malay/Melanau) and Bintang (44.85% Malay/Melanau), DAP’s popularity also increased by 17.37% and 20.35% respectively to 42.84% and 44.39%, despite losing to SUPP in both polling districts.
Another clear example of the swing is from Lambir, a mixed-bumiputera state seat under the Sibuti parliamentary seat, which is close to Miri. Miri International Airport is located in the constituency.
The seat has a majority of bumiputera voters, with 39.3% Malay/Melanau and 29.7% Iban, but PKR still successfully increased their votes from 1,497 in the last election to 3,104 this year, and the majority was also reduced from 2,834 to 1,521, despite that another opposition party, Snap, has siphoned off 693 votes.
In terms of percentage, the popularity of PBB, which contested under the BN logo, has reduced from 74.31% to 54.98%, a sharp drop of nearly 20%.
The swing among urban or suburban bumiputras is believed to be largely because they faced the same inflationary pressure faced by Chinese urban voters.
Indeed, the urban bumiputera community faces even more perils because most of them belong to the low-income group, living mostly in squatters’ residences beside the beach or in low-cost housing areas in the suburbs.
In addition, thousands of bumiputeras, especially Ibans, in squatter areas such as Canada Hill, Pujut Corner and Kampung Wireless were also relocated to give way to development projects, causing dissatisfaction with the state government.
In contrast to those in rural areas, this group of urban bumiputera voters have more access to information and thus more open to a political alternative.
For instance, one of the ceramah held by PKR on the outskirts of Miri before polling day had attracted around 500 bumiputera voters to listen to leaders like PKR deputy president Azmin Ali (centre in picture).
When one of the leaders asked, “Who is the biggest vacuum cleaner in the state?”, the crowd simultaneously shouted, “Taib”, displaying their dissatisfaction against Sarawak Chief Minister Abdul Taib Mahmud and his government following a series of corruption allegations.
Protest vote against Taib
Meanwhile, the Chinese community in Miri has seen a bigger swing to the opposition, which is as large as 38.22% in some areas, leading to the fall of SUPP president George Chan to DAP novice Ling Sie Kiong in Piasau.
According to the election results, DAP won at least 66% of the Chinese votes in Miri, which is largely a protest vote against Taib and the BN state government.
This is evident in DAP’s victory in two Piasau polling districts with 90 percent Chinese voters – Bazaar and Merbau. During the last election, DAP only gained 28.7% and 29% in these two areas, but their popularity has jumped to 66.59% and 67.22%.
In Pujut, there is also a polling station with 90 percent Chinese voters – Krokop – and DAP’s popularity there has increased sharply from 46.2% to 72.02%.
This has sounded the alarm bells for SUPP, who claim to represent the Sarawak Chinese community within the BN coalition, as the party could only bag less than one-third of the Chinese votes.
Another peril the party faces is that they are getting less support in those polling streams with younger voters.
Before the state election, Miri was seen as the last fortress of SUPP after the fall of Kuching in the last state election and Sibu in last year’s parliamentary by-election to the opposition.
However, this was not surprising since opposition ceramahs in Miri after nomination day have constantly attracted crowds of thousands, evidence of the strong anti-Taib and anti-SUPP sentiment.
Although the Chinese-based SUPP had called on the Chinese community to defend George Chan as deputy chief minister and warned voters about the loss of Chinese representation in government during the last stages of the campaign, this fail to deter voter to back the opposition.
By Wong Teck Chi | Malaysiakini
On top of a huge swing of nearly 40 percent of Chinese voters to Pakatan Rakyat in Miri, a smaller proportion of urban or suburban bumiputera voters has turned to the opposition coalition, which resulted in SUPP losing almost all three state seats in Miri three days ago.
However, the magnitude of the swing is hard to estimate, given that there is no single area in Miri with a super majority of bumiputera voters.
The best example which showed there is some swing to Pakatan among the bumiputera community is Senadin, which is located on the outskirts of Miri.
Despite that that the seat has a mix of 49.98% Chinese, 28.97% Malay or Melanau and 15.88 % Iban, PKR candidate Michael Teo was still able to slash the majority of SUPP incumbent Lee Kim Sin from 4,799 votes in the 2006 state election to just 58 votes.
If not for the controversial postal votes that numbered around 1,000, SUPP would definitely have lost Senadin, and the party would have been totally wiped out from Sarawak’s second largest city.
In a further analysis into the results at Senadin’s polling districts, Malaysiakini has also found that PKR almost won at Kuala Baram despite the constituency having only 37.19% of Chinese, who are considered largely pro-opposition.
There are 31.35% Malay/Melanau voters and 24.46% Iban in Kuala Baram, but PKR still managed to get 47.25% of votes, showing that the multiracial party also got significant support from the bumiputera community in this election.
Beside Senadin, two other state seats – Piasau and Pujut under the Miri parliamentary seat – also showed a similar trend and the Iban swing was more obvious.
Within Piasau’s Lutong polling district, which has the highest number of Iban voters (40.63%), DAP’s popularity has increased tremendously to 56.73%, a jump of 23.06% from 33.67% in the last state election.
Surge in DAP’s popularity
In two other Malay/Melanau majority polling districts – Permaisuri (50.1% Malay/Melanau) and Bintang (44.85% Malay/Melanau), DAP’s popularity also increased by 17.37% and 20.35% respectively to 42.84% and 44.39%, despite losing to SUPP in both polling districts.
Another clear example of the swing is from Lambir, a mixed-bumiputera state seat under the Sibuti parliamentary seat, which is close to Miri. Miri International Airport is located in the constituency.
The seat has a majority of bumiputera voters, with 39.3% Malay/Melanau and 29.7% Iban, but PKR still successfully increased their votes from 1,497 in the last election to 3,104 this year, and the majority was also reduced from 2,834 to 1,521, despite that another opposition party, Snap, has siphoned off 693 votes.
In terms of percentage, the popularity of PBB, which contested under the BN logo, has reduced from 74.31% to 54.98%, a sharp drop of nearly 20%.
The swing among urban or suburban bumiputras is believed to be largely because they faced the same inflationary pressure faced by Chinese urban voters.
Indeed, the urban bumiputera community faces even more perils because most of them belong to the low-income group, living mostly in squatters’ residences beside the beach or in low-cost housing areas in the suburbs.
In addition, thousands of bumiputeras, especially Ibans, in squatter areas such as Canada Hill, Pujut Corner and Kampung Wireless were also relocated to give way to development projects, causing dissatisfaction with the state government.
In contrast to those in rural areas, this group of urban bumiputera voters have more access to information and thus more open to a political alternative.
For instance, one of the ceramah held by PKR on the outskirts of Miri before polling day had attracted around 500 bumiputera voters to listen to leaders like PKR deputy president Azmin Ali (centre in picture).
When one of the leaders asked, “Who is the biggest vacuum cleaner in the state?”, the crowd simultaneously shouted, “Taib”, displaying their dissatisfaction against Sarawak Chief Minister Abdul Taib Mahmud and his government following a series of corruption allegations.
Protest vote against Taib
Meanwhile, the Chinese community in Miri has seen a bigger swing to the opposition, which is as large as 38.22% in some areas, leading to the fall of SUPP president George Chan to DAP novice Ling Sie Kiong in Piasau.
According to the election results, DAP won at least 66% of the Chinese votes in Miri, which is largely a protest vote against Taib and the BN state government.
This is evident in DAP’s victory in two Piasau polling districts with 90 percent Chinese voters – Bazaar and Merbau. During the last election, DAP only gained 28.7% and 29% in these two areas, but their popularity has jumped to 66.59% and 67.22%.
In Pujut, there is also a polling station with 90 percent Chinese voters – Krokop – and DAP’s popularity there has increased sharply from 46.2% to 72.02%.
This has sounded the alarm bells for SUPP, who claim to represent the Sarawak Chinese community within the BN coalition, as the party could only bag less than one-third of the Chinese votes.
Another peril the party faces is that they are getting less support in those polling streams with younger voters.
Before the state election, Miri was seen as the last fortress of SUPP after the fall of Kuching in the last state election and Sibu in last year’s parliamentary by-election to the opposition.
However, this was not surprising since opposition ceramahs in Miri after nomination day have constantly attracted crowds of thousands, evidence of the strong anti-Taib and anti-SUPP sentiment.
Although the Chinese-based SUPP had called on the Chinese community to defend George Chan as deputy chief minister and warned voters about the loss of Chinese representation in government during the last stages of the campaign, this fail to deter voter to back the opposition.
Love is more powerful than hate
http://www.malaysia-today.net/mtcolumns/39824-love-is-more-powerful-than-hate
If the opposition wins 35% of the votes, Barisan Nasional will win 90% of the seats. If the opposition wins 45% of the votes, Barisan Nasional will still rule with a two-thirds majority. If the opposition wins 50% of the votes, Barisan Nasional will still rule with a simple but large majority. If the opposition wins 55% of the votes, Barisan Nasional will still rule with a very slim majority. If the opposition wins 60% of the votes, then Barisan Nasional would probably lose the government. If the opposition wins 65% of the votes, then Barisan Nasional will for sure lose the government.
THE CORRIDORS OF POWER
Raja Petra Kamarudin
BN needs to study why it lost Chinese backing, says Khairy
(The Star) -- Barisan Nasional must continue to look after the interests of the Chinese community despite losing their support in the Sarawak election, said Umno Youth chief Khairy Jamaluddin.
He said Barisan needed to study why it lost the support of the Chinese community and take remedial action.
“I don’t agree with the argument that Barisan need not take care of the Chinese because they are not supporting the coalition.”
“We must pay attention to the needs of all races and demonstrate our intentions through action. We have to be fair to everyone,” he said after attending the Selangor MCA Youth forum here yesterday.
Khairy said Barisan had to admit that the Sarawak election results were poor compared to the last state election despite retaining a two-thirds majority.
This is because the Opposition had managed to capture more than double the seats compared with the seven seats it won in 2006, he said.
“The state election is a wake-up call. It will have an effect on the general election and we have to do more,” he said.
Khairy also said PKR could no longer call the shots in Sarawak after it was overtaken by the DAP as seen by the number of seats won by the two parties.
***************************************
The aftermath of the Sarawak state elections are questions/discussions about why Pakatan Rakyat could not deny Barisan Nasional its two-thirds majority in the Sarawak state assembly, why the Chinese swung to the opposition but not the others, why Pakatan won 45% of the popular vote but only 21% of the seats, how come the people do not hate Barisan Nasional and/or Taib Mahmud enough to kick them out, how come the crowds at the opposition rallies were enormous but it still could not translate to votes, and so on.
These are actually very old issues/topics/questions and I have spoken/written about them many, many times, even on the eve of the Sarawak state election in my Radio Australia interview, which you can hear at this link: (http://www.malaysia-today.net/mtcolumns/no-holds-barred/39762-my-12-minute-interview-with-radio-australia).
In 2000, I wrote an article that was published in Harakah, the party newspaper of PAS: “The wakeup call that did not wake us up”. (http://www.freeanwar.net/April2004/Harakah_030404.htm)
In February 2003, I wrote an article that was published in the Free Anwar Campaign website: “The opposition needs to get its act together”. (http://www.freeanwar.net/june2002/facnews230802a.htm)
In September 2003, I wrote an article that was published in the Free Anwar Campaign website: “Tawan Kedah: Pipedream or pipeline?” (http://www.freeanwar.net/July2003/1999_Election_Analysis.htm)
In January 2004, I wrote an article that was also published in the Free Anwar Campaign website: “Only a revolution and not evolution can bring about change”. (http://www.freeanwar.net/Jan2004/facnews260104.htm)
In March 2004, I wrote an article that was published in the same website: “Crowds don’t translate to votes”. (http://www.freeanwar.net/Mar2004/Harakah_100304.htm)
Those were just some of the many articles I wrote and which were published in Harakah, Berita Keadilan (later called Seruan Keadilan) and the Free Anwar Campaign website.
I really don’t know whether I should repeat everything I have said before. Anyway, if you want to know what I have been saying from way back in 2000, just click those links and read on.
For those who do not like to read, which is basically the majority of Malaysians, let me summarise what I have been saying all these years.
First, don’t be fooled by the crowd turnout. In so many general elections and by-elections, the opposition attracts crowds in the tens of thousands while Barisan Nasional struggles to attract 100 people. But when the votes are counted, Barisan Nasional is the one who wins.
Second, you can’t hope for the voters to vote for you merely because they hate a certain leader or a certain party. You have to get them to vote for you because they love you and/or trust you. It must be a unity of love, not a unity of hate.
Third, if you depend on voters to vote for you because they are Chinese and you are also Chinese, or they are Muslim and you are also Muslim, then you have a very small market. You need to cut across racial and religious boundaries and get universal acceptance.
Fourth, as Peter Shroeder, the political adviser from Germany, said in 2001: voters the world over -- whether in Europe, North America, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, or Asia -- are all the same. The majority of them are selfish. They will want to know what they get for voting for you. It is not about ideals. It is about “what’s in it for me?” -- lower taxes, more money in my pocket, free education and medical benefits, better employment opportunities, welfare if I am not employed, housing, lower utility costs, etc.
Fifth, if the opposition wins 35% of the votes, Barisan Nasional will win 90% of the seats. If the opposition wins 45% of the votes, Barisan Nasional will still rule with a two-thirds majority. If the opposition wins 50% of the votes, Barisan Nasional will still rule with a simple but large majority. If the opposition wins 55% of the votes, Barisan Nasional will still rule with a very slim majority. If the opposition wins 60% of the votes, then Barisan Nasional would probably lose the government. If the opposition wins 65% of the votes, then Barisan Nasional will for sure lose the government.
Sixth, it is almost impossible for the opposition to win 60%-65% of the votes.
So there you have it. No, this is not an “I told you so” article. This is a “is the opposition on the right track” article. Granted the playing field is not level and there is extreme fraud and gerrymandering. But so was there in the last election and every election since Merdeka and every election from now till the end of time.
As Lee Iacocca said: don’t get mad, get even. The question is: what will the opposition need to do to get even? Hey, I am not the politician. Let the politicians answer that one. But whatever it may be, time and time again it has been proven you can’t win the election through ‘normal’ means. You will need a Tsunami. Only when you get a Tsunami will the swing be big enough to offset all the obstacles and handicaps that the opposition is faced with. If not, then the opposition is going to remain the opposition for a long time to come, except maybe in a few states.
If the opposition wins 35% of the votes, Barisan Nasional will win 90% of the seats. If the opposition wins 45% of the votes, Barisan Nasional will still rule with a two-thirds majority. If the opposition wins 50% of the votes, Barisan Nasional will still rule with a simple but large majority. If the opposition wins 55% of the votes, Barisan Nasional will still rule with a very slim majority. If the opposition wins 60% of the votes, then Barisan Nasional would probably lose the government. If the opposition wins 65% of the votes, then Barisan Nasional will for sure lose the government.
THE CORRIDORS OF POWER
Raja Petra Kamarudin
BN needs to study why it lost Chinese backing, says Khairy
(The Star) -- Barisan Nasional must continue to look after the interests of the Chinese community despite losing their support in the Sarawak election, said Umno Youth chief Khairy Jamaluddin.
He said Barisan needed to study why it lost the support of the Chinese community and take remedial action.
“I don’t agree with the argument that Barisan need not take care of the Chinese because they are not supporting the coalition.”
“We must pay attention to the needs of all races and demonstrate our intentions through action. We have to be fair to everyone,” he said after attending the Selangor MCA Youth forum here yesterday.
Khairy said Barisan had to admit that the Sarawak election results were poor compared to the last state election despite retaining a two-thirds majority.
This is because the Opposition had managed to capture more than double the seats compared with the seven seats it won in 2006, he said.
“The state election is a wake-up call. It will have an effect on the general election and we have to do more,” he said.
Khairy also said PKR could no longer call the shots in Sarawak after it was overtaken by the DAP as seen by the number of seats won by the two parties.
***************************************
The aftermath of the Sarawak state elections are questions/discussions about why Pakatan Rakyat could not deny Barisan Nasional its two-thirds majority in the Sarawak state assembly, why the Chinese swung to the opposition but not the others, why Pakatan won 45% of the popular vote but only 21% of the seats, how come the people do not hate Barisan Nasional and/or Taib Mahmud enough to kick them out, how come the crowds at the opposition rallies were enormous but it still could not translate to votes, and so on.
These are actually very old issues/topics/questions and I have spoken/written about them many, many times, even on the eve of the Sarawak state election in my Radio Australia interview, which you can hear at this link: (http://www.malaysia-today.net/mtcolumns/no-holds-barred/39762-my-12-minute-interview-with-radio-australia).
In 2000, I wrote an article that was published in Harakah, the party newspaper of PAS: “The wakeup call that did not wake us up”. (http://www.freeanwar.net/April2004/Harakah_030404.htm)
In February 2003, I wrote an article that was published in the Free Anwar Campaign website: “The opposition needs to get its act together”. (http://www.freeanwar.net/june2002/facnews230802a.htm)
In September 2003, I wrote an article that was published in the Free Anwar Campaign website: “Tawan Kedah: Pipedream or pipeline?” (http://www.freeanwar.net/July2003/1999_Election_Analysis.htm)
In January 2004, I wrote an article that was also published in the Free Anwar Campaign website: “Only a revolution and not evolution can bring about change”. (http://www.freeanwar.net/Jan2004/facnews260104.htm)
In March 2004, I wrote an article that was published in the same website: “Crowds don’t translate to votes”. (http://www.freeanwar.net/Mar2004/Harakah_100304.htm)
Those were just some of the many articles I wrote and which were published in Harakah, Berita Keadilan (later called Seruan Keadilan) and the Free Anwar Campaign website.
I really don’t know whether I should repeat everything I have said before. Anyway, if you want to know what I have been saying from way back in 2000, just click those links and read on.
For those who do not like to read, which is basically the majority of Malaysians, let me summarise what I have been saying all these years.
First, don’t be fooled by the crowd turnout. In so many general elections and by-elections, the opposition attracts crowds in the tens of thousands while Barisan Nasional struggles to attract 100 people. But when the votes are counted, Barisan Nasional is the one who wins.
Second, you can’t hope for the voters to vote for you merely because they hate a certain leader or a certain party. You have to get them to vote for you because they love you and/or trust you. It must be a unity of love, not a unity of hate.
Third, if you depend on voters to vote for you because they are Chinese and you are also Chinese, or they are Muslim and you are also Muslim, then you have a very small market. You need to cut across racial and religious boundaries and get universal acceptance.
Fourth, as Peter Shroeder, the political adviser from Germany, said in 2001: voters the world over -- whether in Europe, North America, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, or Asia -- are all the same. The majority of them are selfish. They will want to know what they get for voting for you. It is not about ideals. It is about “what’s in it for me?” -- lower taxes, more money in my pocket, free education and medical benefits, better employment opportunities, welfare if I am not employed, housing, lower utility costs, etc.
Fifth, if the opposition wins 35% of the votes, Barisan Nasional will win 90% of the seats. If the opposition wins 45% of the votes, Barisan Nasional will still rule with a two-thirds majority. If the opposition wins 50% of the votes, Barisan Nasional will still rule with a simple but large majority. If the opposition wins 55% of the votes, Barisan Nasional will still rule with a very slim majority. If the opposition wins 60% of the votes, then Barisan Nasional would probably lose the government. If the opposition wins 65% of the votes, then Barisan Nasional will for sure lose the government.
Sixth, it is almost impossible for the opposition to win 60%-65% of the votes.
So there you have it. No, this is not an “I told you so” article. This is a “is the opposition on the right track” article. Granted the playing field is not level and there is extreme fraud and gerrymandering. But so was there in the last election and every election since Merdeka and every election from now till the end of time.
As Lee Iacocca said: don’t get mad, get even. The question is: what will the opposition need to do to get even? Hey, I am not the politician. Let the politicians answer that one. But whatever it may be, time and time again it has been proven you can’t win the election through ‘normal’ means. You will need a Tsunami. Only when you get a Tsunami will the swing be big enough to offset all the obstacles and handicaps that the opposition is faced with. If not, then the opposition is going to remain the opposition for a long time to come, except maybe in a few states.
DAP’s giant killer groomed by MCA
http://blog.limkitsiang.com/2011/04/19/daps-giant-killer-groomed-by-mca/
By Kuek Ser Kuang Keng | Malaysiakini
When assigned by then MCA president Ong Ka Ting to revive the party’s UK Club in 2005, Ling Sie Kiong never thought that he would one day become a candidate for the opposition.
More than that, he has turned ‘giant killer’ at the age of 28, unseating SUPP president and deputy chief minister Dr George Chan in the Sarawak election concluded on Saturday.
“I met Ong at Sheffield University when I was looking for sponsorship as president of the UK Malaysian Law Students Union,” said Ling in a phone interview, fresh from his electoral success.
“He suggested I revive the dormant MCA UK Club. My friends and I accepted the challenge. We then set up branches in different universities and also created a website for the club.”
The club also liaised with its counterparts in Umno and MIC to organise activities for Malaysian students in the UK.
Whenever MCA ministers or leaders visited the UK, the club would hold dialogues with them to exchange views on the party and Malaysian politics.
However, Ling did not join the party despite overtures by leaders such as Chor Chee Heung, who was in charge of the overseas club, and one-time deputy education minister Hon Choon Kim.
Ling was also familiar with the DAP’s struggles and leaders. From the age of 14, he had been taken to the party’s ceramah and dinners by his father, a staunch supporter.
“I’m lucky because I had the chance to assess and get to know both sides. From interacting with MCA leaders, I realised the constraints faced by MCA in BN.”
After graduating with law degree in 2006, he returned to Malaysia and did his chambering in DAP chairperson Karpal Singh’s legal film before returning to Miri in 2009.
“Initially I wanted to contribute to my hometown through community service. But on assessing the political landscape after 2008 general election, I found that BN component parties still had no say in the government. So I decided that I needed to come forward,” he said.
On Valentine’s Day this year, apart from celebrating the occasion with his fiancee, Ling declared his dedication to another love – DAP – and joined the party.
“SUPP has no real power in the ruling coalition. What could I do if I join them?” he replied when asked why he chose DAP.
“DAP’s ideology and platform suits me better. I admire the spirit of DAP leaders and their perseverance despite repeated defeats in Miri.”
Priorities in politics
Joining Miri DAP was a tough choice because the ‘oil city’ has been a SUPP stronghold. Anyone active in the opposition would face all kinds of pressure.
“It was a tough struggle. I even shed tears. I had just started my career and got engaged at the end of last year. I had to convince my fiancee, her parents and my parents to support my decision. I appreciate their support very much,” he said of his first two months in politics.
On April 2, a day before the party announced its candidates for the Sarawak election, Ling was told that he had been picked to challenge Chan (right in photo), the six-term Piasau assemblyperson.
“It was very hard for Miri DAP to attract professionals because SUPP was so strong there,” said Ling, explaining his quick elevation in the party’s hierarchy.
What has prompted Ling to dedicate his time and efforts to public affairs and social justice was an event that affected a family member while he was doing his pre-university studies in Miri.
“My uncle was extorted by the police, who abused their power. In that incident, I saw the dark side of society and the importance of legal knowledge. Therefore I decided to study law to protect the rights of my family,” he said.
Growing up, he had also witnessed first-hand the hardship and sorrows of those in dire need.
Born to a poor family in Sibu, Ling and his illiterate parents had migrated to Limbang when he was three.
For seven years, he lived in a double-storey wooden shoplot along the river-front from which his father ran a grocery store downstairs. The family moved to Miri when he was 10.
Looking forward to the first state assembly sitting, Ling pledged to voice the woes of middle- and low-income Mirians, including squatters.
He claimed that Chan, a tycoon, had failed to bring up issues affecting them over the last 30 years, including the lack of electricity and water supply.
But all that is set to ubah (change).
By Kuek Ser Kuang Keng | Malaysiakini
When assigned by then MCA president Ong Ka Ting to revive the party’s UK Club in 2005, Ling Sie Kiong never thought that he would one day become a candidate for the opposition.
More than that, he has turned ‘giant killer’ at the age of 28, unseating SUPP president and deputy chief minister Dr George Chan in the Sarawak election concluded on Saturday.
“I met Ong at Sheffield University when I was looking for sponsorship as president of the UK Malaysian Law Students Union,” said Ling in a phone interview, fresh from his electoral success.
“He suggested I revive the dormant MCA UK Club. My friends and I accepted the challenge. We then set up branches in different universities and also created a website for the club.”
The club also liaised with its counterparts in Umno and MIC to organise activities for Malaysian students in the UK.
Whenever MCA ministers or leaders visited the UK, the club would hold dialogues with them to exchange views on the party and Malaysian politics.
However, Ling did not join the party despite overtures by leaders such as Chor Chee Heung, who was in charge of the overseas club, and one-time deputy education minister Hon Choon Kim.
Ling was also familiar with the DAP’s struggles and leaders. From the age of 14, he had been taken to the party’s ceramah and dinners by his father, a staunch supporter.
“I’m lucky because I had the chance to assess and get to know both sides. From interacting with MCA leaders, I realised the constraints faced by MCA in BN.”
After graduating with law degree in 2006, he returned to Malaysia and did his chambering in DAP chairperson Karpal Singh’s legal film before returning to Miri in 2009.
“Initially I wanted to contribute to my hometown through community service. But on assessing the political landscape after 2008 general election, I found that BN component parties still had no say in the government. So I decided that I needed to come forward,” he said.
On Valentine’s Day this year, apart from celebrating the occasion with his fiancee, Ling declared his dedication to another love – DAP – and joined the party.
“SUPP has no real power in the ruling coalition. What could I do if I join them?” he replied when asked why he chose DAP.
“DAP’s ideology and platform suits me better. I admire the spirit of DAP leaders and their perseverance despite repeated defeats in Miri.”
Priorities in politics
Joining Miri DAP was a tough choice because the ‘oil city’ has been a SUPP stronghold. Anyone active in the opposition would face all kinds of pressure.
“It was a tough struggle. I even shed tears. I had just started my career and got engaged at the end of last year. I had to convince my fiancee, her parents and my parents to support my decision. I appreciate their support very much,” he said of his first two months in politics.
On April 2, a day before the party announced its candidates for the Sarawak election, Ling was told that he had been picked to challenge Chan (right in photo), the six-term Piasau assemblyperson.
“It was very hard for Miri DAP to attract professionals because SUPP was so strong there,” said Ling, explaining his quick elevation in the party’s hierarchy.
What has prompted Ling to dedicate his time and efforts to public affairs and social justice was an event that affected a family member while he was doing his pre-university studies in Miri.
“My uncle was extorted by the police, who abused their power. In that incident, I saw the dark side of society and the importance of legal knowledge. Therefore I decided to study law to protect the rights of my family,” he said.
Growing up, he had also witnessed first-hand the hardship and sorrows of those in dire need.
Born to a poor family in Sibu, Ling and his illiterate parents had migrated to Limbang when he was three.
For seven years, he lived in a double-storey wooden shoplot along the river-front from which his father ran a grocery store downstairs. The family moved to Miri when he was 10.
Looking forward to the first state assembly sitting, Ling pledged to voice the woes of middle- and low-income Mirians, including squatters.
He claimed that Chan, a tycoon, had failed to bring up issues affecting them over the last 30 years, including the lack of electricity and water supply.
But all that is set to ubah (change).
S’wak: Why Pakatan failed to deny 2/3rd majority
http://blog.limkitsiang.com/2011/04/21/swak-why-pakatan-failed-to-deny-23rd-majority/
By Ong Kian Ming
I did not have time to write a prediction piece for the recently concluded Sarawak state election because I was heavily involved in the campaign this time, rather than analysing it as an outside observer.
But I did tweet and put on Facebook (and placed a few friendly wagers) that the BN would lose its two-thirds majority by failing to win at least 47 seats. I was, not for the first time and certainly not for the last time, wrong.
In this first of my two-part analysis of this election, I will quickly lay out the basis for my initial optimism and then proceed to explain, using the election results, why my prediction did not materialise.
I will pay particular attention to the very complicated voting patterns exhibited by the various non-Muslim bumiputera groups because these voters were, and will likely be, the swing voters come the next general election.
Why I thought it was possible
My initial sense of optimism that the BN could possibly lose its two-thirds majority in the state assembly arose way before jitters started manifesting itself among those in the ruling coalition during the course of the 10-day campaign.
I had identified a list of 35 potentially vulnerable seats, not including the eight seats in non-BN hands when the state legislature was dissolved. These seats fell into four categories.
The first category comprises of 15 seats which the BN won with less than 60% of the popular vote in the 2006 state elections.
These include four Chinese-majority seats – N39 Repok, N46 Dudong, N49 Pelawan and N64 Pujut – but also include a number of Malay/Melanau seats – N20 Sadong Jaya, N24 Beting Maro and N30 Saribas – as well as Dayak and Orang Ulu seats – N19 Kedup, N25 Balai Ringin, N26 Bukit Begunan, N29 Batang Ai, N57 Belaga, N60 Kemena and N70 Ba’kelalan.
I also included the Iban-majority seat of Engkilili in this category, since the BN lost this seat in 2006 but subsequently ‘regained’ it back when the Snap candidate, Johnny Rayong, switched parties and joined SUPP.
The second category comprises of seats which the BN won with more than 60% of the vote in 2006 but had favourable demographics for the opposition, they being Chinese majority. The three seats in this category are N13 Batu Kawah, N47 Bawang Assan and N63 Piasau.
The third category comprises of seats which experienced a more than 10% decrease in the level of BN support from the 2006 state election to the 2008 general election.
This includes the Iban-majority seat of N27 Simanggang, which experienced a 31.2% decrease in the level of BN support from 83.3% to 52.1%, and N56 Baleh, an Iban-majority seat where voters have been affected by the Bakun dam construction, where the level of BN support plunged by 26.2%, from 89.5% to 62.3%. There are 11 seats which fall under the third category.
The fourth and last category features seats which the BN won by more than 60% in 2006 but which have been affected by new campaign issues.
Unhappiness over the treatment of the local population as a result of dam-building activities in Bengoh and Baram could have potentially affected voters in six seats – N1 Opar, N16 Bengoh, N17 Tarat, N18 Tebedu (Bengoh) and N66 Marudi and N67 Telang Usan (Baram).
For the opposition to deny the BN the two-thirds majority, it needed to retain all eight of its seats and win another 16 out of the 35 potentially vulnerable seats. Tripling the number of opposition seats was a tall order, but the ingredients for a potential tsunami were present.
A chief minister in Abdul Taib Mahmud, who had been in power in the state for over 30 years; the growing body of evidence of the wealth that he and his family had amassed, both in Sarawak and abroad, through website Sarawak Report and the dissemination of this information through Radio Free Sarawak and through word of mouth; the growing disputes over NCR (native customary land) as a result of aggressive expansion by Peninsular-based oil palm companies into Sarawak; the evictions and displacement of many local communities as a result of dam-building activities; the stamping of the Al Kitab and the ban on the use of ‘Allah’ by the local Christian community; all these were reasons to think that the growing urban discontent against Taib and the BN which was already evident among the voters in the Sibu by-election, could penetrate into many of the rural and semi-rural areas, including in some of these potentially vulnerable seats.
But this was not to be. The opposition managed to retain seven out of the eight seats it held, and won another nine seats, two of which – Krian (won by PKR) and Pelagus (won by an independent) – were not on my list of 35 potentially vulnerable seats.
What went wrong then for the opposition? Or to put it in another way, what didn’t go right for the opposition?
I will leave the issue of party organisation, seat negotiations and multi-cornered contests and how they affected the election results to Part 2 of my analysis. Here, I will only undertake a numerical analysis of the election results.
Analysis of voting trends
The first reason as to why the BN was able to keep its two-thirds majority is that the anticipated swing among the non-Muslim bumiputera (NMB) voters was not big enough for the opposition to win many of the NMB majority seats.
Table 2 below shows the overall BN support and the estimated BN support by ethnic group for the 2006 and 2011 state elections.
To simplify my analysis, I grouped all the major NMB ethnic groups – the Bidayuhs, the Ibans and the various groups which are lumped together as Orang Ulu – into a single category.
A more accurate way of estimating the level of BN support would be to use voting results and ethnic composition figures at the polling stream level, but because I do not have such data for all of the seats, I have settled on the next best option, which is to estimate the BN support by ethnic group using state seat level data.
The results in Table 2 (right) confirms that the reality ‘on the ground’, so to speak. The decrease in the level of BN support among the Chinese community was the largest, from 45.1% in 2006 to 25.5% in 2011, representing a drop of 19.6%.
This makes sense since it would not have been possible for the opposition to increase their majority in many of their existing seats by such large margins and to win additional seats, which the SUPP had won with more than 70% of the popular vote in 2006, without a significant swing in the level of BN support among the Chinese.
The NMB support for the BN fell by slightly more than 7% from 63.9% in 2006 to 56.7% in 2011. But unlike the fall in the Chinese support for the BN, the overall fall in the NMB support for the BN did not exhibit a consistent pattern across all the NMB-majority seats.
While one can safely conclude that the Chinese support for the BN fell in most, if not all, of the Chinese-majority seats, the picture for the NMB-majority seats is much more complicated.
Among the 30 seats where the NMB voters comprise more than 50%, there were 22 seats where the level of support for the BN fell and the average fall was 12.8% for these seats. But there were also eight seats in which the level of BN support actually increased, by an average of 12.1%.
Tables 3 and 4 list out the seats in which the level of BN support fell (22 seats) and where it increased (eight seats).
Among the seats listed in Table 3 (right) are many of the potentially vulnerable seats listed in Table 1 above, including N1 Opar, N2 Tasik Biru, N16 Bengoh, N17 Tarat, N19 Kedup, N27 Simanggang and N67 Telung Usan – all of which were won by the BN with less than 60% of the popular vote.
With another 5% swing in the Iban vote, eight of the seats in Table 3 would have gone to the opposition.
At the same time, there were also a number of potentially vulnerable NMB-majority seats that, surprisingly, went into the safe column for the BN (Table 4 below).
These included N25 Balai Ringin and N26 Bukit Begunan as well as N57 Belaga, a seat which the BN won with only 42% of the vote in a multi-cornered fight. The BN made an impressive gain of 24.9% in Engkilili, a seat which the same candidate had won under the Snap banner in 2006 with only 46% of the popular vote.
The BN Batang Ai incumbent also consolidated the gains made during the 2009 by-election by winning 71% of the vote – an increase of 6% from the 65% he obtained two years ago.
It was somewhat surprising that BN made gains in two out of the three state seats in the Sri Aman constituency (N25 Balai Ringin and N26 Bukit Begunan) given numerous reports of land grabs in this area and the presence of two relatively well-known PKR candidates, one of whom was the former state representative for Balai Ringin (Ibi Uding) and the other, a former MP for Sri Aman (Jimmy Donald).
The voting trend among the NMB voters is further complicated by variations in the semi-urban seats with a high percentage of NMB voters.
While it would not have been possible for the opposition to achieve its sizeable gains in seats such as N13 Batu Kawah (21% NMB), N40 Meradong (40% NMB) and N59 Kidurong (35% NMB) without at least some decrease in the BN support among the NMB voters, a quick comparison of the NMB-majority voting districts in N46 Dudong (37% NMB) and N47 Bawang Assan (33% NMB) showed that the NMB support for the BN actually increased in these areas.
No statewide swing among non-Muslim bumis
What conclusions can we then draw in regard to the NMB voting patterns in 2011?
Firstly, that we there was not the same kind of statewide swing against the BN that was seen among the Chinese voters. The NMB voters comprise of different ethnic groups and are not as cohesive as the Chinese and most importantly, are not moved to vote in respond in a uniform manner to the common issues of NCR land rights, land grabs and relocation and displacement due to dam building.
In other words, the salience of land grabs affecting Iban voters in one area will not move Iban voters in other, perhaps even neighbouring areas, from voting against the BN. Only if these issues seriously affect the majority of voters in one area, will they vote against the BN in significant numbers and only in that affected area.
The second conclusion which can be drawn is that the candidate factor makes much more of a difference in the NMB-majority seats compared to the urban seats. This is not to say that personality issues are not important in the urban areas.
One of the reasons why DAP’s Chong Chieng Jen managed to win the Kota Sentosa seat despite the presence of 3,000 postal votes is his popularity among his constituents. But the magnitude of difference is much greater in the non-urban non-Chinese majority seats.
A candidate who was serviced his constituents well, including possibly resolving some of the land issues, would be able to stem the tide of a swing against the BN. This would explain some of the results in the seats in Table 4, where the support for the BN actually increased.
At the same time, one cannot assume that a former state assemblyperson or MP, who is now competing as an opposition candidate, would be a better candidate. More often than not, voters would remember the failure to deliver constituency services rather than past services rendered, which is probably why some of these candidates were dropped by BN in the first place.
On the other hand, well-financed and new opposition candidates who have not contested before but nonetheless have worked the ground consistently in the period leading up to the state elections may produce electoral shocks as was the case with Ali Biju (PKR) in Krian and George Lagong (right) (Independent) in Pelagus.
The third conclusion I would draw is that one cannot assume that the NMB areas which are located near town centres such as Sibu, Miri and Kuching would automatically be more inclined to vote for an opposition candidate.
Many of the polling stations in the state seats of Dudong and Bawang Assan, although located about an hour from Sibu town (by boat or by car), still do not have running water or electricity.
If given a choice between a Chinese DAP candidate who cannot speak their language and who cannot provide them with monetary incentives or development projects and a BN Chinese candidate who can give them both, at least two out of three Iban voters would choose the latter.
The situation here is somewhat reversed from Peninsular Malaysia where one would expect voters in the urban areas who are from one race to be more likely to vote for an opposition candidate of another race compared to those in the less urbanised areas.
Finally, I briefly discuss voting patterns among the Malay/Melanaus (MM). Table 2 shows that the BN support among the MM actually increased slightly from 78.3% to 79.6%, an increase of about 1.3%. This should not be that surprising given the strength of the PBB in these areas and also the continued popularity of the chief minister among the Malay/Melanaus.
But even here, there are some differences in the changes of support for the BN in the MM-majority seats. In the 21 MM-majority seats, 13 experienced a fall in the level of BN support, by an average of 7.0%, while eight experienced an increase by an average of 8.1%.
Even though the BN support among the Malay/Melanaus increased slightly, there were more MM majority seats in which the level of BN support fell because of the presence of Chinese and NMB voters in these seats.
Tables 5 and 6 below lists out the seats in which the level of BN support fell (13 seats) and where it increased (eight seats).
Among the MM-majority seats where level of BN support fell was N24 Beting Maro, a seat which PAS stood a chance of winning. However, this was the only MM-majority seat in Table 5 where the BN’s popular vote stood at less than 60% in the 2011 state election.
The BN made impressive gains in many of the MM-majority seats listed in Table 5 (above), registering double-digit gains in four out of the eight state seats.
Among the seats in Table 5 are N20 Sadong Jaya and N30 Saribas, two MM-majority seats which the BN won by less than 60% of the popular vote in 2006 but are now firmly in the safe column after gains of 13.4% and 13.5% by the BN, respectively.
Unless there is a serious split within the PBB as a result of a leadership tussle after Taib leaves, it is hard to imagine the opposition winning any of the MM-majority seats in the next state election.
More in-depth study required
This long article has barely scratched the surface of the complexity of Sarawakian politics.
Only a much more in-depth academic study can uncover the reasons as to why BN performed better or worse in many of these constituencies, especially those outside the urban centres including the service record of BN incumbents, possible sabotage by dropped candidates, the salience of local issues such as land grabs and dam building, the financing and on the ground presence of opposition candidates, just to mention a few.
The purpose of this article is to provide some facts and figures that will hopefully help improve the overall understanding of Sarawak politics and elections.
This article broadly agrees with an earlier Malaysiakini article by Bridget Welsh in that the swing against the BN in Sarawak was not just confined to the Chinese voters but it included a large percentage of NMB voters as well as MM voters in selected constituencies.
Where there are differences is in the magnitude of the swing against the BN among the different ethnic groups. This article maintains that the Chinese vote swing against the BN was the largest, followed by the NMB voters.
Even though the overall figures show a decrease in the level of BN support among the NMB voters and a slight increase among the MM voters, there is significant variation in the level of BN support within the NMB and MM-majority seats.
The next part of this analysis will discuss the impact of the state polls and the challenges faced by both the BN and the opposition parties ahead of the 13th general election.
———-
ONG KIAN MING holds a PhD in Political Science from Duke University. He is currently pioneering a Master in Public Policy (MPP) program at UCSI University. He can be reached at im.ok.man@gmail.com. He was based in Sibu during the state election.
By Ong Kian Ming
I did not have time to write a prediction piece for the recently concluded Sarawak state election because I was heavily involved in the campaign this time, rather than analysing it as an outside observer.
But I did tweet and put on Facebook (and placed a few friendly wagers) that the BN would lose its two-thirds majority by failing to win at least 47 seats. I was, not for the first time and certainly not for the last time, wrong.
In this first of my two-part analysis of this election, I will quickly lay out the basis for my initial optimism and then proceed to explain, using the election results, why my prediction did not materialise.
I will pay particular attention to the very complicated voting patterns exhibited by the various non-Muslim bumiputera groups because these voters were, and will likely be, the swing voters come the next general election.
Why I thought it was possible
My initial sense of optimism that the BN could possibly lose its two-thirds majority in the state assembly arose way before jitters started manifesting itself among those in the ruling coalition during the course of the 10-day campaign.
I had identified a list of 35 potentially vulnerable seats, not including the eight seats in non-BN hands when the state legislature was dissolved. These seats fell into four categories.
The first category comprises of 15 seats which the BN won with less than 60% of the popular vote in the 2006 state elections.
These include four Chinese-majority seats – N39 Repok, N46 Dudong, N49 Pelawan and N64 Pujut – but also include a number of Malay/Melanau seats – N20 Sadong Jaya, N24 Beting Maro and N30 Saribas – as well as Dayak and Orang Ulu seats – N19 Kedup, N25 Balai Ringin, N26 Bukit Begunan, N29 Batang Ai, N57 Belaga, N60 Kemena and N70 Ba’kelalan.
I also included the Iban-majority seat of Engkilili in this category, since the BN lost this seat in 2006 but subsequently ‘regained’ it back when the Snap candidate, Johnny Rayong, switched parties and joined SUPP.
The second category comprises of seats which the BN won with more than 60% of the vote in 2006 but had favourable demographics for the opposition, they being Chinese majority. The three seats in this category are N13 Batu Kawah, N47 Bawang Assan and N63 Piasau.
The third category comprises of seats which experienced a more than 10% decrease in the level of BN support from the 2006 state election to the 2008 general election.
This includes the Iban-majority seat of N27 Simanggang, which experienced a 31.2% decrease in the level of BN support from 83.3% to 52.1%, and N56 Baleh, an Iban-majority seat where voters have been affected by the Bakun dam construction, where the level of BN support plunged by 26.2%, from 89.5% to 62.3%. There are 11 seats which fall under the third category.
The fourth and last category features seats which the BN won by more than 60% in 2006 but which have been affected by new campaign issues.
Unhappiness over the treatment of the local population as a result of dam-building activities in Bengoh and Baram could have potentially affected voters in six seats – N1 Opar, N16 Bengoh, N17 Tarat, N18 Tebedu (Bengoh) and N66 Marudi and N67 Telang Usan (Baram).
For the opposition to deny the BN the two-thirds majority, it needed to retain all eight of its seats and win another 16 out of the 35 potentially vulnerable seats. Tripling the number of opposition seats was a tall order, but the ingredients for a potential tsunami were present.
A chief minister in Abdul Taib Mahmud, who had been in power in the state for over 30 years; the growing body of evidence of the wealth that he and his family had amassed, both in Sarawak and abroad, through website Sarawak Report and the dissemination of this information through Radio Free Sarawak and through word of mouth; the growing disputes over NCR (native customary land) as a result of aggressive expansion by Peninsular-based oil palm companies into Sarawak; the evictions and displacement of many local communities as a result of dam-building activities; the stamping of the Al Kitab and the ban on the use of ‘Allah’ by the local Christian community; all these were reasons to think that the growing urban discontent against Taib and the BN which was already evident among the voters in the Sibu by-election, could penetrate into many of the rural and semi-rural areas, including in some of these potentially vulnerable seats.
But this was not to be. The opposition managed to retain seven out of the eight seats it held, and won another nine seats, two of which – Krian (won by PKR) and Pelagus (won by an independent) – were not on my list of 35 potentially vulnerable seats.
What went wrong then for the opposition? Or to put it in another way, what didn’t go right for the opposition?
I will leave the issue of party organisation, seat negotiations and multi-cornered contests and how they affected the election results to Part 2 of my analysis. Here, I will only undertake a numerical analysis of the election results.
Analysis of voting trends
The first reason as to why the BN was able to keep its two-thirds majority is that the anticipated swing among the non-Muslim bumiputera (NMB) voters was not big enough for the opposition to win many of the NMB majority seats.
Table 2 below shows the overall BN support and the estimated BN support by ethnic group for the 2006 and 2011 state elections.
To simplify my analysis, I grouped all the major NMB ethnic groups – the Bidayuhs, the Ibans and the various groups which are lumped together as Orang Ulu – into a single category.
A more accurate way of estimating the level of BN support would be to use voting results and ethnic composition figures at the polling stream level, but because I do not have such data for all of the seats, I have settled on the next best option, which is to estimate the BN support by ethnic group using state seat level data.
The results in Table 2 (right) confirms that the reality ‘on the ground’, so to speak. The decrease in the level of BN support among the Chinese community was the largest, from 45.1% in 2006 to 25.5% in 2011, representing a drop of 19.6%.
This makes sense since it would not have been possible for the opposition to increase their majority in many of their existing seats by such large margins and to win additional seats, which the SUPP had won with more than 70% of the popular vote in 2006, without a significant swing in the level of BN support among the Chinese.
The NMB support for the BN fell by slightly more than 7% from 63.9% in 2006 to 56.7% in 2011. But unlike the fall in the Chinese support for the BN, the overall fall in the NMB support for the BN did not exhibit a consistent pattern across all the NMB-majority seats.
While one can safely conclude that the Chinese support for the BN fell in most, if not all, of the Chinese-majority seats, the picture for the NMB-majority seats is much more complicated.
Among the 30 seats where the NMB voters comprise more than 50%, there were 22 seats where the level of support for the BN fell and the average fall was 12.8% for these seats. But there were also eight seats in which the level of BN support actually increased, by an average of 12.1%.
Tables 3 and 4 list out the seats in which the level of BN support fell (22 seats) and where it increased (eight seats).
Among the seats listed in Table 3 (right) are many of the potentially vulnerable seats listed in Table 1 above, including N1 Opar, N2 Tasik Biru, N16 Bengoh, N17 Tarat, N19 Kedup, N27 Simanggang and N67 Telung Usan – all of which were won by the BN with less than 60% of the popular vote.
With another 5% swing in the Iban vote, eight of the seats in Table 3 would have gone to the opposition.
At the same time, there were also a number of potentially vulnerable NMB-majority seats that, surprisingly, went into the safe column for the BN (Table 4 below).
These included N25 Balai Ringin and N26 Bukit Begunan as well as N57 Belaga, a seat which the BN won with only 42% of the vote in a multi-cornered fight. The BN made an impressive gain of 24.9% in Engkilili, a seat which the same candidate had won under the Snap banner in 2006 with only 46% of the popular vote.
The BN Batang Ai incumbent also consolidated the gains made during the 2009 by-election by winning 71% of the vote – an increase of 6% from the 65% he obtained two years ago.
It was somewhat surprising that BN made gains in two out of the three state seats in the Sri Aman constituency (N25 Balai Ringin and N26 Bukit Begunan) given numerous reports of land grabs in this area and the presence of two relatively well-known PKR candidates, one of whom was the former state representative for Balai Ringin (Ibi Uding) and the other, a former MP for Sri Aman (Jimmy Donald).
The voting trend among the NMB voters is further complicated by variations in the semi-urban seats with a high percentage of NMB voters.
While it would not have been possible for the opposition to achieve its sizeable gains in seats such as N13 Batu Kawah (21% NMB), N40 Meradong (40% NMB) and N59 Kidurong (35% NMB) without at least some decrease in the BN support among the NMB voters, a quick comparison of the NMB-majority voting districts in N46 Dudong (37% NMB) and N47 Bawang Assan (33% NMB) showed that the NMB support for the BN actually increased in these areas.
No statewide swing among non-Muslim bumis
What conclusions can we then draw in regard to the NMB voting patterns in 2011?
Firstly, that we there was not the same kind of statewide swing against the BN that was seen among the Chinese voters. The NMB voters comprise of different ethnic groups and are not as cohesive as the Chinese and most importantly, are not moved to vote in respond in a uniform manner to the common issues of NCR land rights, land grabs and relocation and displacement due to dam building.
In other words, the salience of land grabs affecting Iban voters in one area will not move Iban voters in other, perhaps even neighbouring areas, from voting against the BN. Only if these issues seriously affect the majority of voters in one area, will they vote against the BN in significant numbers and only in that affected area.
The second conclusion which can be drawn is that the candidate factor makes much more of a difference in the NMB-majority seats compared to the urban seats. This is not to say that personality issues are not important in the urban areas.
One of the reasons why DAP’s Chong Chieng Jen managed to win the Kota Sentosa seat despite the presence of 3,000 postal votes is his popularity among his constituents. But the magnitude of difference is much greater in the non-urban non-Chinese majority seats.
A candidate who was serviced his constituents well, including possibly resolving some of the land issues, would be able to stem the tide of a swing against the BN. This would explain some of the results in the seats in Table 4, where the support for the BN actually increased.
At the same time, one cannot assume that a former state assemblyperson or MP, who is now competing as an opposition candidate, would be a better candidate. More often than not, voters would remember the failure to deliver constituency services rather than past services rendered, which is probably why some of these candidates were dropped by BN in the first place.
On the other hand, well-financed and new opposition candidates who have not contested before but nonetheless have worked the ground consistently in the period leading up to the state elections may produce electoral shocks as was the case with Ali Biju (PKR) in Krian and George Lagong (right) (Independent) in Pelagus.
The third conclusion I would draw is that one cannot assume that the NMB areas which are located near town centres such as Sibu, Miri and Kuching would automatically be more inclined to vote for an opposition candidate.
Many of the polling stations in the state seats of Dudong and Bawang Assan, although located about an hour from Sibu town (by boat or by car), still do not have running water or electricity.
If given a choice between a Chinese DAP candidate who cannot speak their language and who cannot provide them with monetary incentives or development projects and a BN Chinese candidate who can give them both, at least two out of three Iban voters would choose the latter.
The situation here is somewhat reversed from Peninsular Malaysia where one would expect voters in the urban areas who are from one race to be more likely to vote for an opposition candidate of another race compared to those in the less urbanised areas.
Finally, I briefly discuss voting patterns among the Malay/Melanaus (MM). Table 2 shows that the BN support among the MM actually increased slightly from 78.3% to 79.6%, an increase of about 1.3%. This should not be that surprising given the strength of the PBB in these areas and also the continued popularity of the chief minister among the Malay/Melanaus.
But even here, there are some differences in the changes of support for the BN in the MM-majority seats. In the 21 MM-majority seats, 13 experienced a fall in the level of BN support, by an average of 7.0%, while eight experienced an increase by an average of 8.1%.
Even though the BN support among the Malay/Melanaus increased slightly, there were more MM majority seats in which the level of BN support fell because of the presence of Chinese and NMB voters in these seats.
Tables 5 and 6 below lists out the seats in which the level of BN support fell (13 seats) and where it increased (eight seats).
Among the MM-majority seats where level of BN support fell was N24 Beting Maro, a seat which PAS stood a chance of winning. However, this was the only MM-majority seat in Table 5 where the BN’s popular vote stood at less than 60% in the 2011 state election.
The BN made impressive gains in many of the MM-majority seats listed in Table 5 (above), registering double-digit gains in four out of the eight state seats.
Among the seats in Table 5 are N20 Sadong Jaya and N30 Saribas, two MM-majority seats which the BN won by less than 60% of the popular vote in 2006 but are now firmly in the safe column after gains of 13.4% and 13.5% by the BN, respectively.
Unless there is a serious split within the PBB as a result of a leadership tussle after Taib leaves, it is hard to imagine the opposition winning any of the MM-majority seats in the next state election.
More in-depth study required
This long article has barely scratched the surface of the complexity of Sarawakian politics.
Only a much more in-depth academic study can uncover the reasons as to why BN performed better or worse in many of these constituencies, especially those outside the urban centres including the service record of BN incumbents, possible sabotage by dropped candidates, the salience of local issues such as land grabs and dam building, the financing and on the ground presence of opposition candidates, just to mention a few.
The purpose of this article is to provide some facts and figures that will hopefully help improve the overall understanding of Sarawak politics and elections.
This article broadly agrees with an earlier Malaysiakini article by Bridget Welsh in that the swing against the BN in Sarawak was not just confined to the Chinese voters but it included a large percentage of NMB voters as well as MM voters in selected constituencies.
Where there are differences is in the magnitude of the swing against the BN among the different ethnic groups. This article maintains that the Chinese vote swing against the BN was the largest, followed by the NMB voters.
Even though the overall figures show a decrease in the level of BN support among the NMB voters and a slight increase among the MM voters, there is significant variation in the level of BN support within the NMB and MM-majority seats.
The next part of this analysis will discuss the impact of the state polls and the challenges faced by both the BN and the opposition parties ahead of the 13th general election.
———-
ONG KIAN MING holds a PhD in Political Science from Duke University. He is currently pioneering a Master in Public Policy (MPP) program at UCSI University. He can be reached at im.ok.man@gmail.com. He was based in Sibu during the state election.
Challenges for BN, Pakatan after the S’wak polls
http://blog.limkitsiang.com/2011/04/22/challenges-for-bn-pakatan-after-the-swak-polls/
By Ong Kian Ming Apr 22, 11
In Part 1 of my analysis on the Sarawak elections, I explained the opposition’s failure to deny the BN a two-thirds majority in terms of the insufficient and unevenly distributed non-Muslim bumiputera (NMB) vote swing against the BN.
The complexity of the changes in the level of BN support in the NMB-majority seats, and to a lesser degree, the Malay/Melanau-majority seats, were also illustrated and explained.
Here, in Part 2 of my analysis, I put forth some of the implications and challenges for each of the major parties within the BN in Sarawak as well as the opposition in light of the election results.
What will Taib do now?
The biggest campaign issue during this state election was the length of time Abdul Taib Mahmud had been in power and when he would step down as chief minister. After the election, this issue remains unresolved.
The importance of Taib’s post-election plans as a political issue occupies an even greater prominence because he is at once the BN’s as well as the opposition’s greatest asset and liability in Sarawak.
Prime Minister Najib Razak and Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, both of whom were sending not-so-subtle signals to the Sarawak electorate that Taib would step down soon after the election because of the fear that he could cost BN the two-thirds majority, can no longer use this excuse to pressure Taib to retire.
After all, Taib did accomplish the goal of retaining the two-thirds majority relatively comfortably and his own party, PBB, winning all 35 of its seats with 68.3 percent of the popular vote in these seats.
To force Taib to step down before the next general election would be to risk a leadership struggle within PBB that may result in a Malay/Melanau faction breaking away to form its own party or to join an existing opposition party.
We have seen in Malaysia and in other similar non-democratic regimes that elite splits in the ruling party are one of the main causes of a long standing regime losing power through the ballot box.
At the same time, Najib cannot guarantee that Taib and his family will not adopt a more aggressive approach towards maximising their remaining period in office and hence, increase the rate of land grabs, dam building and oil palm estate expansion which may lead to the BN losing more votes from the Dayak community, where, according to my calculations shown earlier, such a swing had already taken place in this state election.
For Pakatan, and especially the DAP, Taib stepping down will deprive the opposition coalition of a central focal point for future campaigns, in the upcoming general election and in the next state election. If this happens, the best the opposition can hope for is for there to be a serious leadership tussle within PBB that would lead to a faction breaking off from this linchpin party of Sarawak BN.
My best guess is that the status quo will prevail until at least the next general election. The question which remains is what Taib will do to regain back some of the lost NMB vote since it will be hard for him to win back a significant number of Chinese votes.
Under this scenario, the BN will have to make up for the additional three to four parliamentary seats it will lose in the urban areas in Sarawak in the next general election by winning back more seats in Peninsular Malaysia in order to regain the two-thirds parliamentary majority.
Will SUPP become another Gerakan?
Prior to this election, there was already speculation that the SUPP was in danger of turning into a Gerakan – a Chinese-based party being wiped out in the only state which it has a significant political presence in. After April 16, SUPP’s worst fears were confirmed.
If not for the presence of postal votes in the Senadin seat in Miri, SUPP would have been left with only one Chinese state assemblyperson, Wong Soon Koh (right), who managed to achieve a relatively comfortable 1,800 vote majority in the 33 percent Iban seat of Bawang Assan in Sibu.
Fortunately for SUPP, BN still holds the reins of power in Sarawak and the state elections are held separately from the parliamentary elections which mean that its parliamentary representatives in the Chinese-majority seats of Stampin, Lanang, Sarikei and Miri did not lose their seats.
SUPP’s political representation in Sarawak has not been completely erased, unlike Gerakan’s presence in Penang after March 2008.
But still, the oldest political party in Sarawak will face an uphill task in trying to renew and rejuvenate itself, a promise which SUPP president Dr George Chan (right) failed to deliver following a smaller setback in the 2006 state election.
Gerakan’s ‘recovery’ efforts do not bode well for SUPP. Because of established hierarchical structures, it is hard to catapult fresh faces into positions of prominence. Without a strong leader, factional infighting becomes more pronounced and often spills into the public arena as demonstrated by the vote of no-confidence initiated against Penang Gerakan chief Teng Hock Nan’s leadership.
The more politically idealistic, especially the younger generation, would prefer to join the DAP rather than a component party in the BN. SUPP can expect to go through the same struggles which Gerakan has experienced and is currently experiencing in Peninsular Malaysia.
In addition, SUPP has to attempt to chart a new course for the party in light of the new reality of having more Iban than Chinese state assemblypersons within its ranks. Is it realistic to expect these Iban state assemblypersons to move up the ranks of leadership within what is still very much a Chinese-based party?
SUPP’s best hope, in the near term, is that the Chinese swing against the BN will not be as large in the general election therefore allowing it to keep one or two of the six Chinese-majority parliamentary seats in Sarawak. The renewal and rejuvenation process will take much longer to occur, if it happens at all.
The rise of the Dayak parties
Perhaps the biggest beneficiaries within the BN as a result of SUPP’s losses are the two Dayak-based parties – PRS and SPDP. PRS and SPDP now have eight and six seats respectively in the state assembly and there has already been some discussion on the appointment of an Iban deputy chief minister from one of these two parties, likely to be PRS president James Masing.
If Masing is indeed appointed as the DCM 2, it may pave the way for the much discussed merger between PRS and SPDP. Such a merger would be a double-edge sword for the BN in Sarawak.
A strengthened Dayak-based party arising from this merger may be a solution towards stemming any further slide in the level of BN support among the Ibans and the Bidayuhs. But this party could also prove to be a threat to PBB if there emerges pressure from within the state to have a Dayak chief minister after Taib steps down.
The strategy of divide and conquer, employed so effectively in the past to weaken Dayak representation and power in the state government, would work less well if there is only one Dayak party in the BN in Sarawak and in the context of a weakened SUPP, which can no longer collaborate as effectively with the PBB to weaken and divide the Dayaks.
It would not be too far-fetched to imagine that some of the SUPP Dayak state representatives would be tempted to join this merged entity if the interests of the Dayak community could be further advanced (and if they can aspire to a higher office than what the SUPP could offer them).
While Taib is publicly supportive of such a move, the greater likelihood is that he prefers the status quo of a divided Dayak representation within the BN in Sarawak.
What next for the DAP?
Having won 12 out of the 15 seats it contested in, what is next for the largest opposition party in Sarawak? The gains made by the DAP in each of the major cities in Sarawak – Kuching, Sibu, Sarikei, Bintulu and Miri, firmly cements its position as a national party with a strong opposition presence in most of the urban areas in Malaysia and as part of the state government in Penang and Selangor.
When the dust has settled (and it is settling very fast), the DAP will find that it faces a number of major challenges with its expanded representation in Sarawak. Firstly, it will have to beef up its local machinery in anticipation of the general election where it can win four more parliamentary seats, based on the state election results. But it will have to do this without the significant support system from Peninsular Malaysia that was present during the state election.
This can be achieved by leveraging on the ability of the new state assemblypersons to build and mobilise their own electoral machines. It has to strike while the iron is still hot and while the luster of the successful campaign still remains by recruiting volunteers and signing up new members.
The party should also seriously consider bringing in some fresh faces to contest in the urban parliamentary seats which the DAP stands a very good chance of winning, namely Stampin, Sarikei, Lanang and Miri.
By doing this, the party can broaden its base and build up a new generation of younger leaders to lead the party. This model was successfully adopted in Piasau where former president of the MCA Overseas Club Ling Sie Kiong (left) joined the DAP and achieved the role of a giant killer by defeating the SUPP president.
Secondly, it will have to minimise the pernicious effects of regional factionalism when it comes to competing for positions within the DAP state leadership. Some of the ill effects of these internal fights have been experienced by the DAP in Perak and Selangor, for example, but because of the dispersion of the DAP representatives in the different cities across the state, the likelihood of regional cliques and power bases forming is much greater. SUPP’s experience is a testament of this phenomenon.
Thirdly, the DAP needs to find creative ways to reach out to the Dayak voters in the out-of-town areas as part of a larger process of penetrating BN Dayak strongholds. The party can use its organisational and financial resources in the major cities to help PKR candidates who are working the ground outside these cities. And it can also consider reaching out to these areas more directly, especially if credible Dayak leaders can be attracted to join the party.
The recent proposal by DAP’s Lim Kit Siang for the party to merge with Snap is particularly noteworthy since it can potentially break open new ground for both parties.
Aspiring Dayak politicians who have seen and perhaps experienced Snap’s disastrous electoral performance may find the DAP to be a more suitable avenue to make a political impact. They would be following in the footsteps of DAP’s Leon Donald, who contested in the Iban-majority seat of Simanggang and managed to decrease BN’s share of the popular by almost 17 percent.
Can PKR penetrate the interiors?
The last-minute selection of candidates and the burden of contesting in 49 state seats certainly diluted the effectiveness of PKR’s overall campaign in Sarawak.
Although PKR managed to win only three of these seats, the fact that they won more votes than Snap candidates in 25 overlapping seats dispels the myth that PKR is seen as a Peninsular-based party that cannot do better than a ‘local’ Sarawakian party like Snap. But this silver lining has to be backed up by continual on-the-ground efforts.
In a post-election environment, it is very likely that only a handful of PKR candidates will continue to work the ground in order to build up the support base for the opposition in the next general and state election. The challenge then for the PKR state leadership is to ascertain which among the candidates fielded are dedicated to the political struggle against the BN in Sarawak.
In areas where such dedicated candidates are found, help in the form of resources and manpower should be given. In areas with fly-by-night candidates, PKR should consider finding new possible candidates and asking them to work the ground in order to earn the right to compete in the next general or state election.
Because of resource constraints, it would make sense for PKR to cede some of these seats to DAP, especially if the DAP is successful in attracting a few credible Iban leaders to join its ranks.
Even if PKR competes in ‘only’ 44 seats and the DAP competes in 20, PKR can still claim the chief minister’s position if Pakatan as a whole manages to win a majority of state seats especially if such an arrangement was agreed upon by Pakatan beforehand.
The leadership of PKR in Sarawak also has to deal with the challenge of managing the conflict between the various factions within the party in the state. The question of why a Lun Bawang, in the person of Baru Bian, should lead the state leadership rather than a Dayak leader will continue to be whispered within the PKR ranks in Sarawak.
This is a challenge which Baru must overcome with minimal interference from PKR in Peninsular Malaysia. At the same time, Baru must also realise that without a strong and charismatic Dayak leader within the ranks of PKR in Sarawak, it would be hard for the party to convince more Dayak voters to support it.
Dynamics between DAP and PKR
While DAP and PKR managed to avoid three-cornered fights (which wasn’t the case in the 2008 general election), the seat negotiation process revealed many frayed tensions between the two parties and may have affected electoral preparations in some of the disputed seats.
The next big test for both parties would be in the negotiations over the distribution of parliamentary seats in Sarawak in the next general election. It would not be easy for PKR to lay claim to any of the winnable Chinese-majority urban seats because of DAP’s stronger position and brand name in these areas.
In response, PKR may be tempted to reject demands by DAP to contest in some Iban-majority seats where it has Iban leaders. A possible compromise would be for the DAP to exchange a Chinese-majority seat in an area with a strong PKR local leader (Miri’s Michael Teo comes to mind) with a few of the tougher Iban-majority areas which the DAP can ‘invest’ in not just for the general election but also for the next state election.
The point here is that the sooner the seat negotiations are concluded, the more time the potential candidates and their parties have to get ready their elections machinery for these areas.
Possible scenarios for both sides
Before I conclude, I shall outline what I think will be the best case political scenarios for the BN and for Pakatan leading up to the next state election. The end result would probably be somewhere in between the best and worst possible outcomes for both these coalitions, but it is nonetheless instructive to evaluate the unlikely in order to contextualise the likely.
The coalition which is closer to the ideal scenario is likely to have the political advantage in the next state election.
Best-case scenario for the BN: Taib identifies a Malay successor who is acceptable to the PBB as well as to Umno. The case for Umno to enter Sarawak is weakened and the likelihood of serious strife within PBB is decreased significantly.
James Masing is named as the second DCM without too much protest from the PPB and SUPP. He manages to convince SPDP to merge with PRS but is careful not to threaten PBB’s dominant position within the BN in Sarawak.
SUPP elects Miri MP and Minister of Energy, Green Technology and Water Peter Chin as its president. In the meantime, a fresh pool of candidates from different backgrounds, age groups and gender are identified and given the mandate and resources to work the ground in the urban areas. SUPP’s old guard does not protest but fades quietly into the background. Only two out of the four SUPP Chinese-majority parliamentary seats are lost in the next general election.
Best-case scenario for Pakatan: The DAP quickly moves to expand its membership in the major cities. New volunteers step up to the plate including aspiring candidates who may be fielded in the next general election. Snap successfully merges with DAP and this encourages more Iban members and aspiring candidates to join the merged entity.
Approximately half of the PKR candidates continue to work the ground with some support given by the state leadership and by the DAP. Ali Biju, the newly-elected state assemblyperson for Krian, emerges as a Dayak PKR leader who can work well with Baru Bian.
Parliamentary seat negotiations with the DAP are concluded way in advance of the next general election. Credible candidates are identified and given sufficient time to prepare. PKR wins two or three parliamentary seats and DAP wins four or five. Pakatan wins 10 parliamentary seats in Sarawak.
As a concluding note, the gains made by the opposition in Sarawak would likely force Najib to postpone the general election to the end of this year, at the earliest, but more likely to early 2012.
The tough Sarawak battle means that the BN cannot assume that either Sabah or Sarawak can be considered fixed deposit seats in the next general election.
By Ong Kian Ming Apr 22, 11
In Part 1 of my analysis on the Sarawak elections, I explained the opposition’s failure to deny the BN a two-thirds majority in terms of the insufficient and unevenly distributed non-Muslim bumiputera (NMB) vote swing against the BN.
The complexity of the changes in the level of BN support in the NMB-majority seats, and to a lesser degree, the Malay/Melanau-majority seats, were also illustrated and explained.
Here, in Part 2 of my analysis, I put forth some of the implications and challenges for each of the major parties within the BN in Sarawak as well as the opposition in light of the election results.
What will Taib do now?
The biggest campaign issue during this state election was the length of time Abdul Taib Mahmud had been in power and when he would step down as chief minister. After the election, this issue remains unresolved.
The importance of Taib’s post-election plans as a political issue occupies an even greater prominence because he is at once the BN’s as well as the opposition’s greatest asset and liability in Sarawak.
Prime Minister Najib Razak and Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, both of whom were sending not-so-subtle signals to the Sarawak electorate that Taib would step down soon after the election because of the fear that he could cost BN the two-thirds majority, can no longer use this excuse to pressure Taib to retire.
After all, Taib did accomplish the goal of retaining the two-thirds majority relatively comfortably and his own party, PBB, winning all 35 of its seats with 68.3 percent of the popular vote in these seats.
To force Taib to step down before the next general election would be to risk a leadership struggle within PBB that may result in a Malay/Melanau faction breaking away to form its own party or to join an existing opposition party.
We have seen in Malaysia and in other similar non-democratic regimes that elite splits in the ruling party are one of the main causes of a long standing regime losing power through the ballot box.
At the same time, Najib cannot guarantee that Taib and his family will not adopt a more aggressive approach towards maximising their remaining period in office and hence, increase the rate of land grabs, dam building and oil palm estate expansion which may lead to the BN losing more votes from the Dayak community, where, according to my calculations shown earlier, such a swing had already taken place in this state election.
For Pakatan, and especially the DAP, Taib stepping down will deprive the opposition coalition of a central focal point for future campaigns, in the upcoming general election and in the next state election. If this happens, the best the opposition can hope for is for there to be a serious leadership tussle within PBB that would lead to a faction breaking off from this linchpin party of Sarawak BN.
My best guess is that the status quo will prevail until at least the next general election. The question which remains is what Taib will do to regain back some of the lost NMB vote since it will be hard for him to win back a significant number of Chinese votes.
Under this scenario, the BN will have to make up for the additional three to four parliamentary seats it will lose in the urban areas in Sarawak in the next general election by winning back more seats in Peninsular Malaysia in order to regain the two-thirds parliamentary majority.
Will SUPP become another Gerakan?
Prior to this election, there was already speculation that the SUPP was in danger of turning into a Gerakan – a Chinese-based party being wiped out in the only state which it has a significant political presence in. After April 16, SUPP’s worst fears were confirmed.
If not for the presence of postal votes in the Senadin seat in Miri, SUPP would have been left with only one Chinese state assemblyperson, Wong Soon Koh (right), who managed to achieve a relatively comfortable 1,800 vote majority in the 33 percent Iban seat of Bawang Assan in Sibu.
Fortunately for SUPP, BN still holds the reins of power in Sarawak and the state elections are held separately from the parliamentary elections which mean that its parliamentary representatives in the Chinese-majority seats of Stampin, Lanang, Sarikei and Miri did not lose their seats.
SUPP’s political representation in Sarawak has not been completely erased, unlike Gerakan’s presence in Penang after March 2008.
But still, the oldest political party in Sarawak will face an uphill task in trying to renew and rejuvenate itself, a promise which SUPP president Dr George Chan (right) failed to deliver following a smaller setback in the 2006 state election.
Gerakan’s ‘recovery’ efforts do not bode well for SUPP. Because of established hierarchical structures, it is hard to catapult fresh faces into positions of prominence. Without a strong leader, factional infighting becomes more pronounced and often spills into the public arena as demonstrated by the vote of no-confidence initiated against Penang Gerakan chief Teng Hock Nan’s leadership.
The more politically idealistic, especially the younger generation, would prefer to join the DAP rather than a component party in the BN. SUPP can expect to go through the same struggles which Gerakan has experienced and is currently experiencing in Peninsular Malaysia.
In addition, SUPP has to attempt to chart a new course for the party in light of the new reality of having more Iban than Chinese state assemblypersons within its ranks. Is it realistic to expect these Iban state assemblypersons to move up the ranks of leadership within what is still very much a Chinese-based party?
SUPP’s best hope, in the near term, is that the Chinese swing against the BN will not be as large in the general election therefore allowing it to keep one or two of the six Chinese-majority parliamentary seats in Sarawak. The renewal and rejuvenation process will take much longer to occur, if it happens at all.
The rise of the Dayak parties
Perhaps the biggest beneficiaries within the BN as a result of SUPP’s losses are the two Dayak-based parties – PRS and SPDP. PRS and SPDP now have eight and six seats respectively in the state assembly and there has already been some discussion on the appointment of an Iban deputy chief minister from one of these two parties, likely to be PRS president James Masing.
If Masing is indeed appointed as the DCM 2, it may pave the way for the much discussed merger between PRS and SPDP. Such a merger would be a double-edge sword for the BN in Sarawak.
A strengthened Dayak-based party arising from this merger may be a solution towards stemming any further slide in the level of BN support among the Ibans and the Bidayuhs. But this party could also prove to be a threat to PBB if there emerges pressure from within the state to have a Dayak chief minister after Taib steps down.
The strategy of divide and conquer, employed so effectively in the past to weaken Dayak representation and power in the state government, would work less well if there is only one Dayak party in the BN in Sarawak and in the context of a weakened SUPP, which can no longer collaborate as effectively with the PBB to weaken and divide the Dayaks.
It would not be too far-fetched to imagine that some of the SUPP Dayak state representatives would be tempted to join this merged entity if the interests of the Dayak community could be further advanced (and if they can aspire to a higher office than what the SUPP could offer them).
While Taib is publicly supportive of such a move, the greater likelihood is that he prefers the status quo of a divided Dayak representation within the BN in Sarawak.
What next for the DAP?
Having won 12 out of the 15 seats it contested in, what is next for the largest opposition party in Sarawak? The gains made by the DAP in each of the major cities in Sarawak – Kuching, Sibu, Sarikei, Bintulu and Miri, firmly cements its position as a national party with a strong opposition presence in most of the urban areas in Malaysia and as part of the state government in Penang and Selangor.
When the dust has settled (and it is settling very fast), the DAP will find that it faces a number of major challenges with its expanded representation in Sarawak. Firstly, it will have to beef up its local machinery in anticipation of the general election where it can win four more parliamentary seats, based on the state election results. But it will have to do this without the significant support system from Peninsular Malaysia that was present during the state election.
This can be achieved by leveraging on the ability of the new state assemblypersons to build and mobilise their own electoral machines. It has to strike while the iron is still hot and while the luster of the successful campaign still remains by recruiting volunteers and signing up new members.
The party should also seriously consider bringing in some fresh faces to contest in the urban parliamentary seats which the DAP stands a very good chance of winning, namely Stampin, Sarikei, Lanang and Miri.
By doing this, the party can broaden its base and build up a new generation of younger leaders to lead the party. This model was successfully adopted in Piasau where former president of the MCA Overseas Club Ling Sie Kiong (left) joined the DAP and achieved the role of a giant killer by defeating the SUPP president.
Secondly, it will have to minimise the pernicious effects of regional factionalism when it comes to competing for positions within the DAP state leadership. Some of the ill effects of these internal fights have been experienced by the DAP in Perak and Selangor, for example, but because of the dispersion of the DAP representatives in the different cities across the state, the likelihood of regional cliques and power bases forming is much greater. SUPP’s experience is a testament of this phenomenon.
Thirdly, the DAP needs to find creative ways to reach out to the Dayak voters in the out-of-town areas as part of a larger process of penetrating BN Dayak strongholds. The party can use its organisational and financial resources in the major cities to help PKR candidates who are working the ground outside these cities. And it can also consider reaching out to these areas more directly, especially if credible Dayak leaders can be attracted to join the party.
The recent proposal by DAP’s Lim Kit Siang for the party to merge with Snap is particularly noteworthy since it can potentially break open new ground for both parties.
Aspiring Dayak politicians who have seen and perhaps experienced Snap’s disastrous electoral performance may find the DAP to be a more suitable avenue to make a political impact. They would be following in the footsteps of DAP’s Leon Donald, who contested in the Iban-majority seat of Simanggang and managed to decrease BN’s share of the popular by almost 17 percent.
Can PKR penetrate the interiors?
The last-minute selection of candidates and the burden of contesting in 49 state seats certainly diluted the effectiveness of PKR’s overall campaign in Sarawak.
Although PKR managed to win only three of these seats, the fact that they won more votes than Snap candidates in 25 overlapping seats dispels the myth that PKR is seen as a Peninsular-based party that cannot do better than a ‘local’ Sarawakian party like Snap. But this silver lining has to be backed up by continual on-the-ground efforts.
In a post-election environment, it is very likely that only a handful of PKR candidates will continue to work the ground in order to build up the support base for the opposition in the next general and state election. The challenge then for the PKR state leadership is to ascertain which among the candidates fielded are dedicated to the political struggle against the BN in Sarawak.
In areas where such dedicated candidates are found, help in the form of resources and manpower should be given. In areas with fly-by-night candidates, PKR should consider finding new possible candidates and asking them to work the ground in order to earn the right to compete in the next general or state election.
Because of resource constraints, it would make sense for PKR to cede some of these seats to DAP, especially if the DAP is successful in attracting a few credible Iban leaders to join its ranks.
Even if PKR competes in ‘only’ 44 seats and the DAP competes in 20, PKR can still claim the chief minister’s position if Pakatan as a whole manages to win a majority of state seats especially if such an arrangement was agreed upon by Pakatan beforehand.
The leadership of PKR in Sarawak also has to deal with the challenge of managing the conflict between the various factions within the party in the state. The question of why a Lun Bawang, in the person of Baru Bian, should lead the state leadership rather than a Dayak leader will continue to be whispered within the PKR ranks in Sarawak.
This is a challenge which Baru must overcome with minimal interference from PKR in Peninsular Malaysia. At the same time, Baru must also realise that without a strong and charismatic Dayak leader within the ranks of PKR in Sarawak, it would be hard for the party to convince more Dayak voters to support it.
Dynamics between DAP and PKR
While DAP and PKR managed to avoid three-cornered fights (which wasn’t the case in the 2008 general election), the seat negotiation process revealed many frayed tensions between the two parties and may have affected electoral preparations in some of the disputed seats.
The next big test for both parties would be in the negotiations over the distribution of parliamentary seats in Sarawak in the next general election. It would not be easy for PKR to lay claim to any of the winnable Chinese-majority urban seats because of DAP’s stronger position and brand name in these areas.
In response, PKR may be tempted to reject demands by DAP to contest in some Iban-majority seats where it has Iban leaders. A possible compromise would be for the DAP to exchange a Chinese-majority seat in an area with a strong PKR local leader (Miri’s Michael Teo comes to mind) with a few of the tougher Iban-majority areas which the DAP can ‘invest’ in not just for the general election but also for the next state election.
The point here is that the sooner the seat negotiations are concluded, the more time the potential candidates and their parties have to get ready their elections machinery for these areas.
Possible scenarios for both sides
Before I conclude, I shall outline what I think will be the best case political scenarios for the BN and for Pakatan leading up to the next state election. The end result would probably be somewhere in between the best and worst possible outcomes for both these coalitions, but it is nonetheless instructive to evaluate the unlikely in order to contextualise the likely.
The coalition which is closer to the ideal scenario is likely to have the political advantage in the next state election.
Best-case scenario for the BN: Taib identifies a Malay successor who is acceptable to the PBB as well as to Umno. The case for Umno to enter Sarawak is weakened and the likelihood of serious strife within PBB is decreased significantly.
James Masing is named as the second DCM without too much protest from the PPB and SUPP. He manages to convince SPDP to merge with PRS but is careful not to threaten PBB’s dominant position within the BN in Sarawak.
SUPP elects Miri MP and Minister of Energy, Green Technology and Water Peter Chin as its president. In the meantime, a fresh pool of candidates from different backgrounds, age groups and gender are identified and given the mandate and resources to work the ground in the urban areas. SUPP’s old guard does not protest but fades quietly into the background. Only two out of the four SUPP Chinese-majority parliamentary seats are lost in the next general election.
Best-case scenario for Pakatan: The DAP quickly moves to expand its membership in the major cities. New volunteers step up to the plate including aspiring candidates who may be fielded in the next general election. Snap successfully merges with DAP and this encourages more Iban members and aspiring candidates to join the merged entity.
Approximately half of the PKR candidates continue to work the ground with some support given by the state leadership and by the DAP. Ali Biju, the newly-elected state assemblyperson for Krian, emerges as a Dayak PKR leader who can work well with Baru Bian.
Parliamentary seat negotiations with the DAP are concluded way in advance of the next general election. Credible candidates are identified and given sufficient time to prepare. PKR wins two or three parliamentary seats and DAP wins four or five. Pakatan wins 10 parliamentary seats in Sarawak.
As a concluding note, the gains made by the opposition in Sarawak would likely force Najib to postpone the general election to the end of this year, at the earliest, but more likely to early 2012.
The tough Sarawak battle means that the BN cannot assume that either Sabah or Sarawak can be considered fixed deposit seats in the next general election.
称民联播下良政种子 安华确信胜利将到来
Apr 18, 2011 12:50:50 pm http://www.merdekareview.com/news/n/17946.html
本刊记者撰述】国会在野党领袖安华依布拉欣认为，尽管民联没法在砂拉越州选取得理想中的成绩，但他相信民联已经种下良政的种子，胜利将会到来。
安华认为，砂拉越州选证明争取全民公正并非易事，但是亦非不可能的事。虽然民联没有得到想要的成绩，但他相信民联已经种下良政的种子，以便砂拉越人民摒弃狭隘的种族政治，勇于反抗霸权和努力巩固民主。
安华表示，无法否认的是，在竞选期间，民联在资源限制和坚持干净竞选下，成功攻克一直被视为国阵堡垒的内陆选区。
“虽然如此，选举委员会的公信力和诚信受损，因为出现了有关选委会偏颇或蓄意漠视舞弊事件的报道。我被告知，在数个地区，民联的工作人员没有得到14号表格，而这份表格是确保选举成绩免于舞弊的重要文件。”
“除此之外，也有报道称，在数个地区如都东（Dudong）、峇旺阿山（Bawang Assan）和马拉端（Meradong）出现买票事件。”
另外，安华指出，选委员拒绝在人民公正党上阵的史纳汀（Senadin）选区重算选票，再度印证了大家认为选委会维护国阵利益的指责。
“人民公正党候选人张有庆只以58票败选，为什么没有给出合理的理由，拒绝重算选票？”
安华说，砂拉越州选的成绩并非一个终结点，反之是争取更精确和全面的改变的一个开端。“如果砂拉越人民没有一起确保成事，这肯定无法办到。我呼吁想要改变和热爱公正的砂拉越人民加把劲，千万别气馁、保持高昂士气，以在下一届选举推翻这个腐败的政权。”
他感谢及恭贺全体砂拉越人民和民联助选人员交出勇气、作出牺牲，并说胜利肯定将会到来。
本刊记者撰述】国会在野党领袖安华依布拉欣认为，尽管民联没法在砂拉越州选取得理想中的成绩，但他相信民联已经种下良政的种子，胜利将会到来。
安华认为，砂拉越州选证明争取全民公正并非易事，但是亦非不可能的事。虽然民联没有得到想要的成绩，但他相信民联已经种下良政的种子，以便砂拉越人民摒弃狭隘的种族政治，勇于反抗霸权和努力巩固民主。
安华表示，无法否认的是，在竞选期间，民联在资源限制和坚持干净竞选下，成功攻克一直被视为国阵堡垒的内陆选区。
“虽然如此，选举委员会的公信力和诚信受损，因为出现了有关选委会偏颇或蓄意漠视舞弊事件的报道。我被告知，在数个地区，民联的工作人员没有得到14号表格，而这份表格是确保选举成绩免于舞弊的重要文件。”
“除此之外，也有报道称，在数个地区如都东（Dudong）、峇旺阿山（Bawang Assan）和马拉端（Meradong）出现买票事件。”
另外，安华指出，选委员拒绝在人民公正党上阵的史纳汀（Senadin）选区重算选票，再度印证了大家认为选委会维护国阵利益的指责。
“人民公正党候选人张有庆只以58票败选，为什么没有给出合理的理由，拒绝重算选票？”
安华说，砂拉越州选的成绩并非一个终结点，反之是争取更精确和全面的改变的一个开端。“如果砂拉越人民没有一起确保成事，这肯定无法办到。我呼吁想要改变和热爱公正的砂拉越人民加把劲，千万别气馁、保持高昂士气，以在下一届选举推翻这个腐败的政权。”
他感谢及恭贺全体砂拉越人民和民联助选人员交出勇气、作出牺牲，并说胜利肯定将会到来。
Monday, April 18, 2011
鄭丁賢‧古晉的最後一夜
http://opinions.sinchew-i.com/node/18986?tid=17
2011-04-18 09:05
那是競選的最後一天，我選擇古晉，作為行程的最後一站。
天空飄著細雨，人群卻從四面八方進入廣場。
我放眼一望，年輕人成群結隊穿上紅衣，青年夫妻抱著孩子，老人家拄著拐杖，一起站在雨中。
大家都走了老遠一段路，才能擠進這個講座會的廣場。
與其說是要出席反對黨的政治講座會，不如說是一起表態，用行動表明共同的立場。
檳城來的朋友，曾經見證308前夕在韓江草場的大規模集會；檳城那一晚，說是經典。
而此刻的古晉實都東廣場，讓他眼睛發亮：“場面比檳城還壯觀。”他有點無法置信的說。
古晉是個幅員大，人口疏的中等城市。突然間，數萬人聚集在一個範圍不大的商業區廣場，那種擁擠，可以感受到對方體溫，聽到對方脈搏聲，是一種前所未有的一體感。
這個場面，摧毀了人聯黨任何想要翻盤的希望。
以行動黨為主，公正黨為輔的古晉反對黨力量，要在這個晚上，激發最大的熱情，催出最多的選票。
其實，已經不必要；古晉人，或是砂州華人選民，已經斬釘截鐵，燒了橋。
警方試圖中斷大會，行動黨人員有點不知所措，反而是台下的群眾，情緒激昂，決心要捍衛講座會。
警方尷尬退出，群眾爆出勝利的歡呼聲。
講座會得以進行。說實在，不論是場面的控制，節奏的掌握，以及幾位主講者的能力，都在水平之下，冗長沉悶，缺乏內容，冷場頻頻。
但是，群眾以極大的耐心，儘量的鼓掌，盡力的保持場面的熱度。
這一晚，乃至整個競選過程，與其說是行動黨在帶領砂州華人，不如說是砂州華人在引領行動黨。
從詩巫到古晉，我看到來自西馬的黨領袖，以及競選人員，說的是西馬的語言，講的是西馬的狀況。
他們知道砂拉越華人對泰益不滿，對人聯黨的失望，然後，識趣的以迎合的口吻，炮轟泰益和人聯黨。
然而，他們並沒有真正體會砂華人的感受，更未能進入其內心世界。
那是一種長期的失落，持續的受挫、無奈和無力，對未來茫然；經年累月之後，累積成為群體的憤怒。
行動黨是一個管道，選舉是一個引線，真正的能量是在胸中，時間到了，就會引爆。
散場後，群眾還依依不捨，聚集在廣場周圍，要留住餘溫。
這一夜之後，古晉以及其它城市的政治生態，已經改觀。
砂州華人把未來交給了行動黨，行動黨不應該讓他們失望
2011-04-18 09:05
那是競選的最後一天，我選擇古晉，作為行程的最後一站。
天空飄著細雨，人群卻從四面八方進入廣場。
我放眼一望，年輕人成群結隊穿上紅衣，青年夫妻抱著孩子，老人家拄著拐杖，一起站在雨中。
大家都走了老遠一段路，才能擠進這個講座會的廣場。
與其說是要出席反對黨的政治講座會，不如說是一起表態，用行動表明共同的立場。
檳城來的朋友，曾經見證308前夕在韓江草場的大規模集會；檳城那一晚，說是經典。
而此刻的古晉實都東廣場，讓他眼睛發亮：“場面比檳城還壯觀。”他有點無法置信的說。
古晉是個幅員大，人口疏的中等城市。突然間，數萬人聚集在一個範圍不大的商業區廣場，那種擁擠，可以感受到對方體溫，聽到對方脈搏聲，是一種前所未有的一體感。
這個場面，摧毀了人聯黨任何想要翻盤的希望。
以行動黨為主，公正黨為輔的古晉反對黨力量，要在這個晚上，激發最大的熱情，催出最多的選票。
其實，已經不必要；古晉人，或是砂州華人選民，已經斬釘截鐵，燒了橋。
警方試圖中斷大會，行動黨人員有點不知所措，反而是台下的群眾，情緒激昂，決心要捍衛講座會。
警方尷尬退出，群眾爆出勝利的歡呼聲。
講座會得以進行。說實在，不論是場面的控制，節奏的掌握，以及幾位主講者的能力，都在水平之下，冗長沉悶，缺乏內容，冷場頻頻。
但是，群眾以極大的耐心，儘量的鼓掌，盡力的保持場面的熱度。
這一晚，乃至整個競選過程，與其說是行動黨在帶領砂州華人，不如說是砂州華人在引領行動黨。
從詩巫到古晉，我看到來自西馬的黨領袖，以及競選人員，說的是西馬的語言，講的是西馬的狀況。
他們知道砂拉越華人對泰益不滿，對人聯黨的失望，然後，識趣的以迎合的口吻，炮轟泰益和人聯黨。
然而，他們並沒有真正體會砂華人的感受，更未能進入其內心世界。
那是一種長期的失落，持續的受挫、無奈和無力，對未來茫然；經年累月之後，累積成為群體的憤怒。
行動黨是一個管道，選舉是一個引線，真正的能量是在胸中，時間到了，就會引爆。
散場後，群眾還依依不捨，聚集在廣場周圍，要留住餘溫。
這一夜之後，古晉以及其它城市的政治生態，已經改觀。
砂州華人把未來交給了行動黨，行動黨不應該讓他們失望
Tuesday, April 12, 2011
歐陽文風‧我們的馬丁路德金？
http://opinions.sinchew-i.com/node/18923
2011-04-11 19:02
1968年4月4日，美國最著名的民權鬥士馬丁路德金牧師被害身亡，當年他不過39歲！
今年的4月4日，是這位人民英雄，美國的良知，遇害43週年。有人說，因為馬丁路德金牧師，美國的歷史從此改寫。這句話，其實只說對一半。
因為另一半事實是，如果沒有千千萬萬的美國人在背後支持，馬丁路德金根本不可能成就甚麼。馬丁路德金牧師是當時的民權運動領袖，可是領袖不能沒有追隨者。沒有追隨者與支持者的領袖不叫領袖，只是在唱獨角戲的演員，其它人都在看戲，沒有運動。
馬丁路德金之所以可能成就民主事業，因為有千千萬萬的美國人投身運動，力抗霸權，爭自由反奴役，不惜付上一切代價。
馬丁路德金之所以能夠站起來，因為有一位女士堅持不為霸權所動！而這人，就是蘿莎巴克斯（Rosa Parks）。
1955年12年1日，當時美國還有種族隔離政策，白人上巴士，黑人必須讓位，否則就是犯法。那一天，42歲的蘿莎巴克斯坐在巴士上，白人上來，司機要她起立讓位，她堅決不動，結果被捕入獄，直接催生美國近代民權運動。當時許多黑人走出來抗議，大家推選才拿到神學博士學位不久的馬丁路德金牧師出來領導這場運動！
所以我說，沒有蘿絲巴克斯，也不可能有後來的馬丁路德金牧師。
不過，如果當時僅有蘿絲巴克斯與馬丁路德金牧師，也還是不夠撼倒種族主義的惡法與霸權。當蘿絲巴克斯被捕後，許多黑人站起來杯葛巴士，這場拒坐巴士的運動長達382天，引起全國關注。很多黑人甚至不惜走2小時的路去上班，也不坐巴士，除非廢除種族隔離政策。有一位老婦人說“我雙腳疲憊，但我的心靈平安有力！”如果不是這些無名小卒，縱使有蘿斯巴克斯與馬丁路德金牧師，美國還是不可能成就民權運動。
美國黑人不過佔全美人口13%，可他們拒絕以少數自居而委曲求全，他們拒絕迷信退一步海闊天空，他們拒絕迷信沉默是金！
我的美國朋友問我，馬來西亞有好像馬丁路德金這種不畏強權與敢和主流對抗的人嗎？我直接說有，但是我們沒有蘿絲巴克斯，也沒有千千萬萬願意走出來抗議與力爭自由的人！許多人都在等待英雄，都在期待救世主，但自己不願付代價，只想坐亨其成。
我們的馬丁路德金不是被霸權所害，而是被愚民所滅！
星洲日報／言路‧作者：歐陽文風‧自由撰稿人‧2011.04.11
2011-04-11 19:02
1968年4月4日，美國最著名的民權鬥士馬丁路德金牧師被害身亡，當年他不過39歲！
今年的4月4日，是這位人民英雄，美國的良知，遇害43週年。有人說，因為馬丁路德金牧師，美國的歷史從此改寫。這句話，其實只說對一半。
因為另一半事實是，如果沒有千千萬萬的美國人在背後支持，馬丁路德金根本不可能成就甚麼。馬丁路德金牧師是當時的民權運動領袖，可是領袖不能沒有追隨者。沒有追隨者與支持者的領袖不叫領袖，只是在唱獨角戲的演員，其它人都在看戲，沒有運動。
馬丁路德金之所以可能成就民主事業，因為有千千萬萬的美國人投身運動，力抗霸權，爭自由反奴役，不惜付上一切代價。
馬丁路德金之所以能夠站起來，因為有一位女士堅持不為霸權所動！而這人，就是蘿莎巴克斯（Rosa Parks）。
1955年12年1日，當時美國還有種族隔離政策，白人上巴士，黑人必須讓位，否則就是犯法。那一天，42歲的蘿莎巴克斯坐在巴士上，白人上來，司機要她起立讓位，她堅決不動，結果被捕入獄，直接催生美國近代民權運動。當時許多黑人走出來抗議，大家推選才拿到神學博士學位不久的馬丁路德金牧師出來領導這場運動！
所以我說，沒有蘿絲巴克斯，也不可能有後來的馬丁路德金牧師。
不過，如果當時僅有蘿絲巴克斯與馬丁路德金牧師，也還是不夠撼倒種族主義的惡法與霸權。當蘿絲巴克斯被捕後，許多黑人站起來杯葛巴士，這場拒坐巴士的運動長達382天，引起全國關注。很多黑人甚至不惜走2小時的路去上班，也不坐巴士，除非廢除種族隔離政策。有一位老婦人說“我雙腳疲憊，但我的心靈平安有力！”如果不是這些無名小卒，縱使有蘿斯巴克斯與馬丁路德金牧師，美國還是不可能成就民權運動。
美國黑人不過佔全美人口13%，可他們拒絕以少數自居而委曲求全，他們拒絕迷信退一步海闊天空，他們拒絕迷信沉默是金！
我的美國朋友問我，馬來西亞有好像馬丁路德金這種不畏強權與敢和主流對抗的人嗎？我直接說有，但是我們沒有蘿絲巴克斯，也沒有千千萬萬願意走出來抗議與力爭自由的人！許多人都在等待英雄，都在期待救世主，但自己不願付代價，只想坐亨其成。
我們的馬丁路德金不是被霸權所害，而是被愚民所滅！
星洲日報／言路‧作者：歐陽文風‧自由撰稿人‧2011.04.11
Monday, April 11, 2011
拒绝愚蠢！
文：欧阳文风 http://www.malaysiakini.com/columns/161062
愚蠢最难搞，愚蠢最难打倒。因为愚蠢不是有形敌人，不是大炮核弹可以摧毁铲除。愚蠢是一种无孔不入，渗透生活每一个层面与细节的文化；愚蠢，寄生在每一个人的思维之中！
职是之故，每个人都可能愚蠢，都可能做蠢事说蠢话。有人或许在这事上不蠢，但稍微不慎，在另一事上可能愚蠢。愚蠢也与学历无关，不要以为高学历者，如硕士博士就不可能有愚蠢的时候；愚蠢也与专业无关，所以医生、律师、法官等，如果蠢起来的时候，一样叫人叹为观止，一样够力！
蠢话部长还能获得选票
10多年前，就有一个人，不只是医生，还是部长，就曾说过“塞车是繁荣的像征”，不但不以为吉隆坡的塞车不是问题，还引以为荣引以为傲，这种蠢话，连普通人都不敢说，他却说得理直气壮。当然，他大概也看死马来西亚蠢人太多，说了这种蠢话之后，一样可以做部长，愚蠢的老百姓一样给他选票。说蠢话又怎样？我国愚民太多，怕你咬他？这种人都可以做部长，大马之蠢，可想而知！
我国的贪官污吏会太少？可是国阵继续做政府，每一届大选都胜，整整半个世纪有余，我国老百姓不是愚蠢又是甚么？
基督教青年团发出怒吼
最近我国有基督教群体终于醒觉，终于拒绝愚蠢，大马基督教协会青年团终于怒吼。大马基督教协会青年团指政府近40年来打压宗教自由、拒绝批准土地给基督徒设教堂或墓地、废除或禁止学校和大学认可基督教团契、指马来文版圣经威胁国家安全等，并说“这样例子不胜枚举”！
整整40年来，类似例子不胜枚举，这是基督教青年团的文告说的。我的问题是，为甚么到今天才怒吼，才反抗？答案明显不过：因为愚蠢！
如果不是愚蠢，不要说40年，如果有人欺压你4天，都要反抗。但因为愚蠢，不要说4天4个月或4年，整整40年来，可以任人剥削权利，选票每届大选都给他，不敢抗议，不会怒吼，迷信他有一天会变得更好，这不是愚蠢又是甚么？
自扫门前雪的愚蠢国度
马来西亚的基督徒今天完全拒绝愚蠢了吗？身为基督徒，按我对大马基督徒社群的认识，我一点都不奇怪，如果还有基督徒以为国阵最好，还有基督徒在大选时仍然把选票投给国阵！马来西亚是一个愚蠢的国度。
在一个愚蠢的国度里，各人自扫门前雪，如果有佛教徒、兴都教徒、甚至回教徒，拒绝与基督教青年团站在一起对抗霸权，以为事不关己，己不劳心，我一点都不奇怪。在一个愚蠢的国度，有甚么事是不可能发生的？
华人优异考生拿不到奖学金的事，年年发生；政府官员买贵货的事，年年发生；这种事，已经演变到好像过节一样了，可是老百姓做甚么？还不是一样支持国阵？你说，愚蠢可怕吗？
用选票表明勿把我们当白痴
在“一个马来西亚”的口号之下，东马可以入口与印刷马来文圣经，西马则诸多限制，赤裸裸的双重标准，那有甚么“一个”精神？黄天成被禁足砂拉越，政者学者黄进发身为马来西亚人，也不能去砂拉越，他们到底做了甚么恶事？这是甚么“一个马来西亚”精神？砂拉越人如果不愚蠢，就应在这次选举把国阵推翻，以手中神圣一票告诉所有国阵候选人：不要把我们当白痴，不要再剥削我们，我们拒绝愚蠢！
“一个马来西亚”简直就是看死老百姓蠢所设计出来的口号，只是骗人的玩意儿。这里喊“一个马来西亚”，那里却容许官方媒体发表种族主义言论，如果还有人迷信国阵公平，有心塑造一个马来西亚，简直就是愚蠢。
推翻国阵仅拒绝愚蠢第一步
因为愚蠢，很多人相信“所有的政治人物都是这样的啦”，不会生气，不会反抗，不会用手中一票教训政治人物。所有的人都会死，是不是今天我们就无所事事？
因为愚蠢，很多人相信“换了人做又怎样，上位后还不是照贪”。喂，你今天冲凉后明天还会再脏，是不是从此不冲凉？你现在吃了这餐饭后，肯定还会再饿，是不是从此不吃饭？
愚蠢的人的逻辑多荒谬，还要我再比喻吗？
用选票推翻国阵，不会使马来西亚一夜之间繁荣发达起来，也不会使马来西亚马上变成先进国；推翻国阵，只是拒绝愚蠢的第一步！
愚蠢最难搞，愚蠢最难打倒。因为愚蠢不是有形敌人，不是大炮核弹可以摧毁铲除。愚蠢是一种无孔不入，渗透生活每一个层面与细节的文化；愚蠢，寄生在每一个人的思维之中！
职是之故，每个人都可能愚蠢，都可能做蠢事说蠢话。有人或许在这事上不蠢，但稍微不慎，在另一事上可能愚蠢。愚蠢也与学历无关，不要以为高学历者，如硕士博士就不可能有愚蠢的时候；愚蠢也与专业无关，所以医生、律师、法官等，如果蠢起来的时候，一样叫人叹为观止，一样够力！
蠢话部长还能获得选票
10多年前，就有一个人，不只是医生，还是部长，就曾说过“塞车是繁荣的像征”，不但不以为吉隆坡的塞车不是问题，还引以为荣引以为傲，这种蠢话，连普通人都不敢说，他却说得理直气壮。当然，他大概也看死马来西亚蠢人太多，说了这种蠢话之后，一样可以做部长，愚蠢的老百姓一样给他选票。说蠢话又怎样？我国愚民太多，怕你咬他？这种人都可以做部长，大马之蠢，可想而知！
我国的贪官污吏会太少？可是国阵继续做政府，每一届大选都胜，整整半个世纪有余，我国老百姓不是愚蠢又是甚么？
基督教青年团发出怒吼
最近我国有基督教群体终于醒觉，终于拒绝愚蠢，大马基督教协会青年团终于怒吼。大马基督教协会青年团指政府近40年来打压宗教自由、拒绝批准土地给基督徒设教堂或墓地、废除或禁止学校和大学认可基督教团契、指马来文版圣经威胁国家安全等，并说“这样例子不胜枚举”！
整整40年来，类似例子不胜枚举，这是基督教青年团的文告说的。我的问题是，为甚么到今天才怒吼，才反抗？答案明显不过：因为愚蠢！
如果不是愚蠢，不要说40年，如果有人欺压你4天，都要反抗。但因为愚蠢，不要说4天4个月或4年，整整40年来，可以任人剥削权利，选票每届大选都给他，不敢抗议，不会怒吼，迷信他有一天会变得更好，这不是愚蠢又是甚么？
自扫门前雪的愚蠢国度
马来西亚的基督徒今天完全拒绝愚蠢了吗？身为基督徒，按我对大马基督徒社群的认识，我一点都不奇怪，如果还有基督徒以为国阵最好，还有基督徒在大选时仍然把选票投给国阵！马来西亚是一个愚蠢的国度。
在一个愚蠢的国度里，各人自扫门前雪，如果有佛教徒、兴都教徒、甚至回教徒，拒绝与基督教青年团站在一起对抗霸权，以为事不关己，己不劳心，我一点都不奇怪。在一个愚蠢的国度，有甚么事是不可能发生的？
华人优异考生拿不到奖学金的事，年年发生；政府官员买贵货的事，年年发生；这种事，已经演变到好像过节一样了，可是老百姓做甚么？还不是一样支持国阵？你说，愚蠢可怕吗？
用选票表明勿把我们当白痴
在“一个马来西亚”的口号之下，东马可以入口与印刷马来文圣经，西马则诸多限制，赤裸裸的双重标准，那有甚么“一个”精神？黄天成被禁足砂拉越，政者学者黄进发身为马来西亚人，也不能去砂拉越，他们到底做了甚么恶事？这是甚么“一个马来西亚”精神？砂拉越人如果不愚蠢，就应在这次选举把国阵推翻，以手中神圣一票告诉所有国阵候选人：不要把我们当白痴，不要再剥削我们，我们拒绝愚蠢！
“一个马来西亚”简直就是看死老百姓蠢所设计出来的口号，只是骗人的玩意儿。这里喊“一个马来西亚”，那里却容许官方媒体发表种族主义言论，如果还有人迷信国阵公平，有心塑造一个马来西亚，简直就是愚蠢。
推翻国阵仅拒绝愚蠢第一步
因为愚蠢，很多人相信“所有的政治人物都是这样的啦”，不会生气，不会反抗，不会用手中一票教训政治人物。所有的人都会死，是不是今天我们就无所事事？
因为愚蠢，很多人相信“换了人做又怎样，上位后还不是照贪”。喂，你今天冲凉后明天还会再脏，是不是从此不冲凉？你现在吃了这餐饭后，肯定还会再饿，是不是从此不吃饭？
愚蠢的人的逻辑多荒谬，还要我再比喻吗？
用选票推翻国阵，不会使马来西亚一夜之间繁荣发达起来，也不会使马来西亚马上变成先进国；推翻国阵，只是拒绝愚蠢的第一步！
华人笨蛋 （欧阳文风〕
我已经很久没有这么生气了。
早上在纽约读到赵明福死的新闻，还有反贪污委员会的反应，加上政府高官如纳兹里的言论，我对我的国家彻底失望！
接下来，再在〈独立新闻在线〉读到陈文华揭露如何被反贪委员会盘问，调查官员极尽恐吓威胁之能事；如此对待一名市议员，甚至比犯人也不如，这个国家是极权的共产主义国度吗？
更糟糕的竟然还是调查官员不允许陈文华站着「协助调查」（这是好听说词，哪有人如此对待协助者），还指着他的眉心，开口大骂他「ＣＩＮＡ ＢＯＤＯＨ！」
一名市议员被调查官员以如此种族主义的字眼谩骂，如果这个官员不被对付，你以为这个国家可能对一般华人平民有多好？
基宫案无声无息，反贪委员却忙着调查欧阳捍华、刘永山、郭素沁、黄洁冰、杨巧双、谢永贤、李宝霖，对了，还有赵明福。这些人不是不能调查，但更明目张胆的基宫案到底是怎么一回事？一名牙医到底有甚么本事兴建壮观如皇宫般的住家，一扇门就可以等于一幢单层排屋的价格，钱从哪里来？明显的问题不查，却敲锣打豉查几个年轻的民联议员，这是甚么意思？
反贪污委员会到底是反民联，还是反贪污？
更甚的是，竟然骂陈文华「华人笨蛋」？！反贪委员会这是一个怎么病态的组织？！
不过，或许他骂得对，或许华人真的是笨蛋！否则，怎么可能默默忍受这种侮辱？
华人真的可能是笨蛋，明知贪官那么多，明知马华民政当家不当权，还有华人支持马华民政，还有华人投票支持国阵。
华人真的很有可能是笨蛋，种族主主义横行，马华民政到底做了甚么？有官员骂华人市议员是笨蛋，马华民政的声音在哪里？可我们的华社会还有人笨到以为马华民政是我们的希望。这种华人不够笨吗？
华人真的非常有可能是笨蛋，安华当年的黑眼圈，马哈迪说他是自己打自己，真的有人相信，一大把一大把的选票就这样给了当年的马哈迪和国阵，根本不理马哈迪是怎么以种种恶法治国。许多华裔优秀学生进不了大学，拿不到外国深造奖学金，马来人却没有这种问题。这是种族主义，还不够明显吗？笨蛋！
可是面对种种不公平的政策，动不动国阵还有人拿出５１３来吓选民，可还有华人还是支持国阵，这些华人不是笨蛋又是甚么？
华人是笨蛋？！
真的，我越来越怀疑马来西亚有许许多多的华人是笨蛋。懦弱、无知、贪生怕死、欺善怕恶、别人施舍一点甜头，就晕头转向，只想赚钱，只想发财，有奶就是娘，这种人不是蠢才笨蛋又是甚么？
醒醒吧！如果这时候还不醒，还不辨是非，还不反抗，真是彻头彻尾的经典超级大笨蛋！
早上在纽约读到赵明福死的新闻，还有反贪污委员会的反应，加上政府高官如纳兹里的言论，我对我的国家彻底失望！
接下来，再在〈独立新闻在线〉读到陈文华揭露如何被反贪委员会盘问，调查官员极尽恐吓威胁之能事；如此对待一名市议员，甚至比犯人也不如，这个国家是极权的共产主义国度吗？
更糟糕的竟然还是调查官员不允许陈文华站着「协助调查」（这是好听说词，哪有人如此对待协助者），还指着他的眉心，开口大骂他「ＣＩＮＡ ＢＯＤＯＨ！」
一名市议员被调查官员以如此种族主义的字眼谩骂，如果这个官员不被对付，你以为这个国家可能对一般华人平民有多好？
基宫案无声无息，反贪委员却忙着调查欧阳捍华、刘永山、郭素沁、黄洁冰、杨巧双、谢永贤、李宝霖，对了，还有赵明福。这些人不是不能调查，但更明目张胆的基宫案到底是怎么一回事？一名牙医到底有甚么本事兴建壮观如皇宫般的住家，一扇门就可以等于一幢单层排屋的价格，钱从哪里来？明显的问题不查，却敲锣打豉查几个年轻的民联议员，这是甚么意思？
反贪污委员会到底是反民联，还是反贪污？
更甚的是，竟然骂陈文华「华人笨蛋」？！反贪委员会这是一个怎么病态的组织？！
不过，或许他骂得对，或许华人真的是笨蛋！否则，怎么可能默默忍受这种侮辱？
华人真的可能是笨蛋，明知贪官那么多，明知马华民政当家不当权，还有华人支持马华民政，还有华人投票支持国阵。
华人真的很有可能是笨蛋，种族主主义横行，马华民政到底做了甚么？有官员骂华人市议员是笨蛋，马华民政的声音在哪里？可我们的华社会还有人笨到以为马华民政是我们的希望。这种华人不够笨吗？
华人真的非常有可能是笨蛋，安华当年的黑眼圈，马哈迪说他是自己打自己，真的有人相信，一大把一大把的选票就这样给了当年的马哈迪和国阵，根本不理马哈迪是怎么以种种恶法治国。许多华裔优秀学生进不了大学，拿不到外国深造奖学金，马来人却没有这种问题。这是种族主义，还不够明显吗？笨蛋！
可是面对种种不公平的政策，动不动国阵还有人拿出５１３来吓选民，可还有华人还是支持国阵，这些华人不是笨蛋又是甚么？
华人是笨蛋？！
真的，我越来越怀疑马来西亚有许许多多的华人是笨蛋。懦弱、无知、贪生怕死、欺善怕恶、别人施舍一点甜头，就晕头转向，只想赚钱，只想发财，有奶就是娘，这种人不是蠢才笨蛋又是甚么？
醒醒吧！如果这时候还不醒，还不辨是非，还不反抗，真是彻头彻尾的经典超级大笨蛋！
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